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This dissertation focus is the analysis of a possible takeover of a wind turbine manufacturer 
(Gamesa) by one of the biggest conglomerates in the world (ABB). The proposed deal will 
have has business background the diversification strategy of ABB, as well the 
attractiveness of the wind power industry, as well the down trend of both Gamesa’s 
business and value. 
 
For this proposal, it is combined a deep industry and company analysis with the state of the 
art valuation tools. Literature on Valuation and M&A is reviewed and applied to evaluate the 
standalone and merged businesses, proposing an optimal offer price and mode of 
acquisition.  
 
The whole analysis relies on data until end of 2011, being performed estimated for both 
companies stand alone and the combined firm, for a growth and stable period. Data from 
comparables and market benchmarks where also collected for different tools usage. 
 
Gamesa standalone is found to be slightly undervalued, with 9% upside potential, and 
synergies are estimated to be around 59% attributable to Gamesa in the combined firm 
value. Therefore, it is concluded that the deal will create a sustainable value for both 
companies, being the large stake attributable to ABB. 
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PREFACE 
 
Concluding such challenging dissertation with success and being confident of the results is 
a very important step in my education, with a high enlargement of my Finance skills. M&A 
area, by the large scope of work involved, addresses a mix of two very close and related 
environments: Business and Finance. 
 
I would like to express my acknowledgements to all teachers of the Master in Finance 
program, especially to Professor Peter Tsvetkov for important advisory support and 
dedication crucial for the dissertation finish accomplishment.  
 
I am especially grateful for the confidence and enthusiasm transmitted by people close to 
me, keeping me focused and motivated until the very last moment, and to my family for the 
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 1 - Literature Review on Valuation 
 
1.1 – Overview on Valuation 
 
Valuation can be considered the heart of finance, being important, among other proposals, 
to mergers and acquisitions. 
 
In the field of Valuation we find a wide spectrum of models, from the simple to the most 
sophisticated ones, making several assumptions about the path to determine value, sharing 
some common characteristics. According to Damodaran (2006), this classification provides 
several advantages, by making easier to understand where individual models fit in to the 
big picture, why they provide different results and when they have fundamental errors in 
logic. Therefore, is appropriate, despite of this thesis will focus its attention and application 
in one particular method, to describe and take into to account the most important ones. 
 
Fernandez (2007) classifies the methods for valuing companies in six groups: Balance 
Sheet, Income Statement, Mixed (Goodwill), Cash Flow Discounting, Value Creation, 
Options. 
 
The four main groups of company valuation methods most widely used are: 
 
a) Discounted Cash Flow Valuation – relates the value of an asset to the present value of 
expected future cash flows on that asset; 
 
b) Liquidation and Accounting Valuation – built around valuing the assets of a firm, with 
accounting estimates of a value or book value often used as a starting point; 
 
c) Relative Valuation – estimates the value of an asset by looking at the pricing of 
“comparable” assets relative to a common variable like earnings, cash flows, book value or 
sales; 
 
d) Contingent Claim Valuation – uses option pricing models to measure the value of assets 
that share option characteristics. This is what generally falls under the topic of real options. 
 
Further, we will describe the asset as the company. Fernandez (2007) states that the most 
suitable method for valuing a company is to discount the expected future cash flows, as the 
value of a company arises from the company’s capacity to generate cash flows. Therefore, 
we will concentrate our efforts, and further on in the work of the proposed transaction, on 
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1.2 – Discounted Cash Flow Valuation (DCF) 
 
1.2.1 - The Basics 
 
In DCF valuation, the value of company is the present value of its expected cash flows, 
discounted back at a rate that reflects the riskness of these cash flows. This rate is 



















n = Life of the asset 
CFt = Cash flow in period t 
r = Discount rate reflecting the riskness of the estimated cash flows 
 
Due to the importance of the Residual Value or Terminal Value to a company’s valuation, 
this will be subject to discussion in a specific topic of this section. 
 
Damodaran (2006) also states that, beside the above described risk-adjusted discount rate 
DCF approach we can find other ones like certainty equivalent cash flow, adjusted present 
value and excess return. Also states that the risk-adjusted discount rate is the most 
common one, which will be our focus. 
 
The process of valuing a company with the DCF (Steiger, 2008), contains different stages. 
In the first stage scenarios are developed to predict future cash flows for a certain period. 
Since the DCF method is a valuation technique that is based on predictions, a scenario 
analysis is usually conducted to examine the effects of changes in the underlying 
assumptions. That’s why Damodaran (2006) states that using cash flow models are in 
some sense an act of faith. 
 
Deriving the NPV of these free cash flows that accrue in the scenario analysis is very 
complex, because all these cash flows are based on assumptions (Steiger, 2008). To 
provide a detailed view on how the company’s value might be affected by a change in the 
underlying assumptions, a sensitivity analysis is usually conducted.  
 
The most important scenario in valuation of a company is the base case. In this sense, the 
prediction regarding the future development of the company, its relevant markets and 
competitors are used to build the scenario that is most likely to happen. That’s why the 
topic of Industry and Company Review is crucial in this sense.  
 
However, is important to pay attention to the reliability of any figures coming from the 
management, being often a personal incentive to increase the take over price and therefore 
might provide biased estimates. 
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1.2.2 - Deciding and estimating the appropriate Cash Flow for Discounting 
 
The different methods of calculating value by DCF, depends on the type of cash flow that 
we take into account. We can consider the following inputs: 
 
- Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) – is the operating cash flow, that is the cash 
flow generated by operations, without taking into account borrowing (financial 
debt), after tax. It is the money that would be available in the company after 
covering fixed asset investment and working capital requirements, assuming that 
there is no debt and, therefore, there are no financial expenses. 
 
Damodaran (2006) expresses a formula that captures the above descriptions: 
 
FCFF = After-tax Operating Income – (Capital Expenditure – Depreciation) – 
Change in non-cash Working Capital 
 
- Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) – is the cash available to equity investors. Is 
calculated by subtracting from the free cash flow to the firm the interest and 
principal payments (after tax) made in each period to the debt holders and adding 
the new debt provided. In short, it is the cash flow remaining available in the 
company after covering fixed assets investments and working capital requirements 
and after paying the financial charges and repaying the corresponding part of the 
debt’s principal. 
 
Damodaran (1994) expresses a way to measure FCFE that capture the above 
descriptions: 
 
FCFE = Net Income + Depreciation – Capital Expenditures – Change in non-cash 
Working Capital – (New Debt Issued – Debt repayments) 
  
In certain conditions, dividends can also be considered as a sort of equity cash 
flow. In this sense, the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) could be applied using this 
equity cash flow. At the end, dividend represents the only cash flow from the firm 
that it’s tangible to investors. Estimates of FCFE and FCFF remain estimates and 
conservative investors can reasonably argue that they cannot lay claim on these 
cash flows. 
 
However, in the last years we observe firms choosing to hold back cash that they 
can pay out to shareholders, as well the increasing of stock buybacks usage as a 
way of returning cash to stockholders. In deed, the DDM as become decreasingly 
used although the method does have its proponents with recognized advantages. 
 
- Capital Cash Flow (CCF) – is the term given to the sum of the debt cash flow plus 
the equity cash flow. 
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1.2.3 - The Types Cash flows and the Appropriate Discount Rate 
 
According to Fernandez (2009), there are four basic cash flow valuation methods, relating 
the above described cash flows and their appropriate discount rate: 
 
1) From the FCFF and the WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) 
 
The Value of the Debt (D) plus the Value of the Equity (E) is the present value of the 
expected free cash flows (FCF), discounted at the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC): 
 
[2] [ ]tt FCFWACCPVDE ;000 =+  
 
The definition of WACCt is: 
 




Ke = required return on the equity flows; 
Kd = required return on the debt flows (cost of debt); 
T = corporate tax rate; 
 
Et-1 and Dt-1 are the values obtained in the valuation using formula [2]. Consequently, 
the valuation is an interactive process: the FCF are discounted at the WACC to 
calculate the firm’s value (E+D), but the firm’s value (E+D) is needed to obtain the 
WACC. We will return to the cost of capital subject in a specific topic of this section. 
 
 
2) From the FCFE and the required return on the firm’s equity flows (Ke) 
 
The value of Equity (E) is the present value of the expected cash flows for equity 
holders (CFe) discounted at the required return on the firm’s equity flows (Ke): 
 
[4] [ ]tt CFeKePVE ;00 =  
 
The value of Debt (D) is the present value of the expected cash flows for the debt 
(CFd) discounted at the required return on the debt (kd): 
 
[5] [ ]tt CFdKdPVD ;00 =  
 
The expression that relates the FCF with the CFe is1: 
 
[6] ( )TIDFCFCFe tttt −−∆+= 1  
                                                 
1 Free cash flow is the cash flow for equity holders in the hypothetical unlevered firm.  
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Where,  
tD∆ = increase in debt;  
tI = interest paid by the firm; 
CFd = tt DI ∆−  
 
The sum of the values provided [4] and [5] is identical to the value provided by [2]. In 
fact, the WACC is the rate at which the FCF must be discounted to obtain the result 
given by [4] and [5]. 
 
[7] [ ] [ ] [ ]tttttt CFdKdPVCFeKePVFCFWACCPVDE ;;; 00000 +==+  
 
3) From the CCF and the WACCBT (Weighted Average Cost of Capital before Taxes) 
 
The capital cash flows are the cash flows for all of the firm’s stakeholders (Debt and 
Equity), and are equivalent to the cash flow for shareholders (CFe) plus the cash flow 
for the debt holders (CFd) (Fernandez, 2008). 
 
The following formula indicates that the value of debt today (D) plus the value of equity 
(E) is equal to the capital cash flow (CCF) discounted at weighted cost of debt and 
equity before taxes (WACCBT): 
 
[8] [ ]ttBT CCFWACCPVDE ;00 =+  
 
The definition of WACCBT is: 
 
[9] [ ] [ ]11111 / −−−−− ++= ttttttBT DEKdDKeEWACC t  
 
The above expression is obtained by equaling [2] with [8]. 
 
WACCBT represents the discount rate that insures that the value of the firm obtained 
with both expressions is the same. In deed, one way of defining WACCBT is: rate at 
which the CCF must be discounted to obtain the result given by [4] and [5]: 
 
[10] [ ] [ ]ttttBT FCFWACCPVCCFWACCPVDE ;;00 ==+  
 
      The expression that related the CCF with CFe and with the FCF is: 
 
       [11] TIFCFIDCFeCFdCFeCCF tttttttt +=+∆−=+=  
 
Where,  
       tD∆ = 1−− tt DD  
      ttt KdDI 1−=  
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4) The Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
 
The formula below indicates that the value of debt (D) plus that of the equity (E) of the 
levered firm is equal to the value of unlevered firm’s equity (Vu) plus the NPV of the tax 
savings due to payment of interest (VTS): 
 
[12] oVTSVuDE +=+ 000  
 
[13] [ ]tt FCFKuPVVu ;00 =  
Where, 
Ku = required return on the firms unlevered flows (or required return on the asset flows). 
Combining the two above formulas: 
 
[14] [ ] [ ]tttt FCFKuPVFCFWACCPVVuDEVTS ;; 000000 −=−+=  
 
The four approaches described above always have the same output in terms of value for 
the firm, if they are used properly, for any type of forecast (Fernandez, 2008).  
 
There is disagreement among various authors regarding the calculation of the Adjusted 
Present Value (APV): a number of theories exist about the size of Value of Tax Shields 
(VTS). The size of the VTS has implications for the valuation and affects:  
 
- The value of equity (E) and debt of the firm (E+D); 
- The relationship between the required return on asset flows (Ku) and the required 
return on equity flows in the levered firm (ke); 
- The relationship between the WACC and the required return on the asset flows 
(Ku). 
 
1.2.4 - The inputs to determine the Discount Rate 
 
From the topic above we can summarize the relationship between DCF methods and 
discount rate as follows: 
 
Table 1 – Relation between DCF methods and discount rate 
DCF Methods Appropriate Discount Rate Inputs 
FCFF WACC Cost of levered equity (Ke) 
and cost of Debt (Kd) 
FCFE Ke Cost of levered equity  
APV Ku Cost of unlevered equity  
 
The most widely used asset pricing model is still the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)2 
(Goedhart et al. 2005a), with a large majority of the firms using it to estimate the cost of 
                                                 
2 The model was introduced by Jack Treynor (1961, 1962), William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan 
Mossin (1966) independently, building on the earlier work of Harry Markowitz on diversification and modern 
portfolio theory. The model is used to determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return of an asset, if 
that asset is to be added to an already well-diversified portfolio, given that asset's non-diversifiable risk. 
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equity (Damodaran, 2002). The CAPM reveals the return that investors require for bearing 
the risk of holding a company’s share. This required return is the return on equity that 
investors demand to bear risk of holding the company’s share and is, therefore, equivalent 
to the company’s cost of equity, which can be expressed by the following formula (Ross, 
Westerfield, Jordan, 2005): 
 
[15] )( RfRmRfKe L −+= β  
 
Where, (Rm-Rf) is commonly referred as the MRP (Market Risk Premium) 
 
In this sense, CAPM reaches the required return on equity by answering 2 main questions: 
 
1. What return would this investment be required to yield, if it was risk-free? 
2. In case it is actually not risk-free, how much additional return should be required? 
 
Damodaran (2008) provides a good framework for deciding on which rate to use. In his own 
words, “risk in finance is viewed in terms of the variance in actual returns around the 
expected return”.  
 
Nevertheless, there are two conditions to be verified in a risk-free rate: no default risk and 
no reinvestment risk. Respecting both conditions leaves any zero-coupon government bond 
with maturity similar to our investment’s duration as the best Rf estimate. 
 
The risk-free investment realizes returns that are exactly equal to those expected, for a 
time horizon similar to that of our equity investment. Damodaran (2008) states that for 
mature companies (a study on S&P500), duration for an average firm’s equity is around 8 
years, approximately the same as a 10-year treasury bond. 
 
The other parameter, the equity risk premium, should be the future excess return one 
expects from an investment in the market portfolio, above the risk-free rate. 
 
The risk premium demanded by an investor depends on a variety of factors that are difficult 
to translate into a number. Yet, Lettau et al. (2008) prove that economic risk (uncertainty 
about future economic conditions, translated in volatility of real GDP) plays a major role. 
Thus, any analyst that can access reliable GDP growth expectations should try to 
incorporate those into his analysis. Surveying investors about the premium they apply has 
proved to have weak prediction power (Damodaran, 2010). Implied risk premiums in 
current dividend yields are conceptually appealing, but one cannot rely on it when there is 
no consensus about future cash flows. 
 
Risk premium is still a controversial issue over which academics don’t agree. However, 
tracing historical returns on an equity index is generally an acceptable approach. For global 
firms (global operations and investors), which is the case of the considered companies in 
the proposed transactions, picking a global equity index rather than a domestic one may 
make sense. 
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To analyze exposure to market risk, there is the Beta (β). The β parameter measures the 
volatility, or systematic risk, of a stock or portfolio in comparison to the market as a whole. 
To calculate the Beta of a stock, returns on the stock should be regressed against returns 
on an equity index representing the market portfolio. The time frame to be covered by the 
regression could range from 3 to 10 years - the longer the better, as long as the firm hasn’t 
gone through any significant changes in its business mix and leverage over that period 
(Damodaran, 2002). The author also states that monthly returns minimize the bias on our 












Both business risk and financial leverage affect a firm’s equity Beta.  
 
As mentioned previously, depending on the valuation model, we need the unlevered cost of 
equity (or cost of assets, Ku), or the levered cost of equity (Ke). When a Beta is estimated 
through a regression of a firm’s stock against an index, we get Beta for the levered 
company, i.e. the Equity Beta of the firm given the observed leverage. 
An accurate beta for a firm, if not directly regressed, could be obtained from adjusting 
industry betas or peer betas to the firm’s capital structure. Betas can be unlevered and 




























In result we can compute the unlevered cost of equity (Ku) using the following expression: 
 
[19] )( RfRmRfKu U −+= β  
 
The final input, to complete all the required ones to estimate the appropriate discount rate 
is the cost of debt. The cost of debt (Kd) is the required return on a firm’s debt, as if it was 
refinanced today. Specifically, Kd could be estimated by observing the yields at which the 
firm’s bonds are trading, or summing up a risk-free rate and a spread based on Rating 
Agencies’ tables (like Moody’s or S&P), which rely on interest coverage ratios and 
indicators alike. 
 
1.2.5 - Misconceptions and errors in WACC 
 
According to Fernandez (2011), the WACC is just the rate at which the FCFs must be 
discounted to obtain the same result as the valuation using ECFs. WACC is neither a cost 
not a required return: it is a weighted average of a cost and a required return. To refer to 
the WACC as the “cost of capital” may be misleading because it is not a cost.  
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Some errors can occur by not remembering the definition of WACC. Also must be taken 
into account the relationship between the WACC and the VTS. The WACC is a discount 
rate widely used in corporate finance. However the correct calculation of the WACC rests 
on a correct valuation of the tax shields. The VTS depends on the debt policy of the 
company. When the debt level is fixed, the tax shields should be discounted at the required 
return to debt. If the leverage ratio is fixed at the market value, the Miles and Ezzel (1985) 

















g = rate of growing perpetuity 
 
Other debt policies should be explored. For example, Fernandez (2007) develops valuation 
formula for the situation in which the leverage ratio is fixed at book values and argues that it 
is more realistic to assume that a company maintains a fixed book leverage ratio than to 
assume, as Miles and Ezzel do. 
 
Following the above, it’s proper to stress the common error in the WACC determination that 
should be in any case avoided: 
 
Table 2 – Common errors in estimating WACC 
Common error Correct Approach 
Using a wrong tax rate (T) to 
calculate the WACC 
The correct tax rate (T) is the marginal tax rate that 
should be used every year is the T that relates the 
ECF and the FCF. 
Calculating the WACC using book 
values of debt and equity 
The appropriate values of debt and equity are the 
ones resulting from the valuation 
Calculating the WACC assuming a 
capital structure that is neither the 
correct one nor the forecasted. 
The D/E used to calculate the 
WACC is different than the D/E 
ratio resulting from the valuation.  
The outstanding and the forecasted debt should be 
used to calculate WACC. The equity value of a firm 
is given by the difference between the firm value 
and the outstanding debt, where the firm value is 
calculated using the WACC, and the WAC is 
calculated using the outstanding (market value of) 
debt.  
Alternatively, if the firm starts with its current debt 
and moves towards another round of financing, 
than a variable WACC (different for each year) 
should be used, and the current debt should be 
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1.2.6 - Terminal Value 
 
When evaluating a company using the DCF method, Terminal Value can be a key factor 
that might highly influence the final result. The reasonableness of this final economic 
valuation may be doubtful if Terminal Value is a back box whose contents are unclear. 
 
The purpose of Terminal Value is to give a reasonable estimate of the economic value of 
the company in a given year, n, at which point annual forecasts cease to be given. This 
value will depend on the envisaged future scenario. For example, if it is considered 
reasonable that the business be wound up in a year n, the Terminal Value should be the 
liquidation value, net of tax. If the company is being valued as a going concern, the 
economic value may be estimated from market data (extrinsic value) or based on company 
fundamentals (intrinsic value). Table 1 maps out the various alternatives. 
 
Figure 1 










Source: Lubian, 2010 
 
Estimating Terminal Value using an extensive value is simply a matter of using a multiple 
for which it is assumed the company can be sold in year n. 
 
Terminal Value is frequently estimated in the form of an intrinsic value calculated by 
extrapolating from a baseline FCF. 
 
How can a reasonable Terminal Value be estimate? 
 
A publicly traded firm potentially has an infinite life. The value is therefore the present value 
of cash flows forever. Since we can not estimate cash flows forever, we estimate cash 
flows for a “growth period” and then estimate a Terminal Value, to capture the value at the 


























Extrinsic economic value 
(Market Data) 
 
Intrinsic economic value 
(company fundamentals) 
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When a firm’s cash flows grow at a “constant” rate forever, the present value of those cash 
flows can be written as: 
 




r = discount rate (cost of equity or cost of capital); 
g = expected growth rate 
 
In short, when using the DCF method to estimate Terminal Value it is necessary to give a 
reasonable estimate of three variables: 
 
• the rate of growth of the FCF, g; 
• the period considered; 
• the baseline FCF from which the extrapolation is calculated. 
 
Damodaran (2002) states that, when looking at the FCFF, the expected growth rate can be 
expressed as:  
 
[23] Capital on Return x Rate ntReinvestme  Rate Growth Expected =  
 
Where, 
Reinvestment Rate =  
(Capital Expenditure – Depreciation + Investment in Working Capital)/ (EBIT x (1-T)) 
 
[24]  Return on Capital = (EBIT x (1-T)) / Capital invested 
 
However, the reasonableness of the growth rate, g, is often associated with the period 
considered. An infinite period is often used, and a growth rate which does not exceed real 
GDP growth.  
 
The baseline FCF for the extrapolation must be consistent with the value we want to 
estimate. It is not appropriate to use the last year’s FCF as it may not be representative of 
the future to perpetuity that the residual value needs to reflect. How can we detect that? By 
analysing the three components of FCF: (i) FCF from operations; (ii) FCF from needs of 
operational working capital; (iii) FCF from investments and divestments in fixed assets. 
 
In scenarios where the business is expected to continue indefinitely it is often to check that 
the forecast value of ROCE is not much higher than that of WACC. Mature businesses 
usually have levels of profitability which do not exceed the cost of their resources. 
 
The FCF used as the baseline in order to extrapolate an estimate of the Terminal Value 
must also include an investment in working capital and in fixed assets, as it is not 
reasonable to assume that a company may continue indefinitely as a going concern without 
making investments. 
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a) The Terminal Value should reflect the value the company will have in the year in 
question. In other words, how much could the company be sold for in that year? 
(i.e. the value of its total net assets); 
b) The Terminal Value must be consistent with the total economic value of the 
business. Therefore, if the method used to estimate the economic value of the 
business up until year n is DCF, it would be logical to estimate the Terminal Value 
using the same method, unless there are good reasons to do otherwise 
(Damodaran, 2006).  
c) When using DCF method to estimate Terminal Value it is necessary to give a 
reasonable estimate of three variables: the growth rate, g, of the FCF; the period 
considered; and the FCF from which the extrapolation is made; 
d) If we consider a Terminal Value for a scenario in which the company is due to 
continue, an infinite period is often taken and a growth rate, g, that does not 
exceed real GDP growth; 
e) The baseline FCF from which the extrapolation is to be made must be consistent 
with the value we want to estimate. Frequently, it is not appropriate to use the final 
year’s FCF as it may not be representative of the future to perpetuity that the 
Terminal Value needs to reflect. 
f) It is often very useful to check that the forecast does not assume a value of ROCE 
much higher that that of WACC. Mature businesses usually have levels of 
profitability which do not exceed the cost of their resources. 
 
In order to prevent Terminal Value from turning into a back box that could be used to 
justify any economic value, regardless of whether it is reasonable, it is necessary to 
understand what Terminal Value is supposed to show and how it is estimated. 
 
In the case of a valuation based on DCF, to analyse the reasonableness of the 
Terminal Value used, it is necessary to make a reasonable estimate of the main 
economic value generators: the period of time, the growth rate, and the baseline FCF 
from which the extrapolation will be made. 
 
1.3 – Multiples: Role in Valuation 
 
Despite their widespread usage, only limited theory is available to guide the application of 
multiples. Of all the standard textbook authors, Damodaran (2001, 2002, and 2006) is the 
one who puts most weight on the explanation of the characteristics and determinants of 
various multiples.  
 
Although most authors of textbooks affirm the importance of the multiples valuation method 
in practice, along with its usefulness in supporting more complex valuations, they do not 
provide a “functional manual”. Therefore, some practitioners suggest that the selection of 
comparable firms and multiples is essentially an art form, which should be left for 
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professionals. Yet the degree of subjectivity involved in their application is awkward from a 
scientific point of view (Bhojraj and Lee, 2002). 
 
From the valuation accuracy of the multiples valuation method, several studies compare 
this approach to fundamental equity valuation models. Kaplan & Kuback (1995 and 1996) 
while conclude that DCF valuations approximate transaction values reasonably well, they 
also find that simple enterprise value to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EV/EBIDTA) multiples result in similar valuation accuracy. Richter (2005) 
presents a theoretical approach on how to link multiples to the DCF model. His approach is 
based on the fact that multiples consolidate specific information of a firm’s key value 
drovers (i.e., profitability, growth, and risk) which is also processed in the DCF valuation 
formula.  
 
Which companies are truly comparable? Which guide line to choose the right Multiples? 
Based on Mckinsey, 2005, the principles for “well tempered multiples” are: 
 
1. Peer with similar prospects for ROIC and growth 
To choose the right companies, we have to match those with similar expectations 
for growth and ROIC.  
 
Arzac (2005) and Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2005) concentrate on the 
development of criteria for the identification of comparable firms. In an ideal world, 
comparable firms have the same operating and financial characteristics as the firm 
being valued. However, even in finely defined industries, “true” comparables are 
not always available. Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2005), therefore, suggest 
collecting a list of firms based on the finest available industry first, and then further 
shortening this list by excluding firms with different prospecting of profitability and 
growth compared to the target firm. 
 
In a similar context, the market for corporate transactions offers the opportunity to 
construct a peer group based on comparable transactions and therewith investigate 
the properties and valuation accuracy of transaction multiples. One of the major 
drawbacks of this approach is the difficulty of finding “comparable transactions”, as 
well some industry are not so dynamic in terms of deals to catch relevant and 
useful data to apply this kind of multiples. 
 
2. Forward-looking multiples 
 
Empirical evidence shows that forward-looking multiples are more accurate 
predictors of value. Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2000) compared the characteristics 
and performance of historical and forward industry multiples for a subset of 
companies trading on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq. 
When they compared individual companies against their industry mean, the 
dispersion of historical earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios was nearly twice that of one-
year forward E/P ratios. The three also found that forward-looking multiples 
promoted greater accuracy in pricing. 
M&A: The Acquisition of GAMESA by ABB 
Álvaro de Freitas                                                                                                                                     Page 18  94 
 
Both the principles of valuation and the empirical evidence lead us that multiples be 
based on forecast rather than historical profits3. If no reliable forecasts are available 
and we must rely on historical data, make sure to use the latest data possible – for 
the most recent four quarters, not the most recent fiscal year – and eliminate one-
time events. 
 
3. Enterprise-value multiples 
 
Although widely used, P/E multiples have two major flaws. First, they are 
systematically affected by capital structure. For companies whose unlevered P/E 
(the ratio they would have if entirely financed by equity) is greater than one over the 
cost of debt, P/E ratios rise with leverage. Thus, a company with a relatively high 
all-equity P/E can artificially increase its P/E ratio by swapping debt for equity. 
Second, the P/E ratio is based on earnings, which include many non-operating 
items, such as restructuring charges and write-offs. Since these are often one-time 
events, multiples based on P/E can be misleading.  
 
One alternative to the P/E ratio is the ratio of enterprise value to EBITA. In general, 
this ratio is less susceptible to manipulation by changes in capital structure. Since 
enterprise value includes both debt and equity, and EBITA is the profit available to 
investors, a change in capital structure will have no systematic effect. Only when 
such a change lowers the cost of capital will changes lead to a higher multiple. 
Even so, don’t forget that enterprise-value-to-EBITA multiples still depend on ROIC 
and growth. 
 
4. Adjust the enterprise-value-to-EBITA multiple for non-operating items 
 
Although the one-time non-operating items in net income make EBITA superior to 
earnings for calculating multiples, even enterprise-value-to-EBITA multiples must 
be adjusted for non-operating items hidden within enterprise value and EBITA, both 
of which must be adjusted for these non-operating items, such as excess cash and 
operating leases. Failing to do so can generate misleading results. 
 
A properly executed multiples analysis can make financial forecasts more accurate. 
Any analysis, however, is only as accurate as the forecasts it relies on.  
 
Errors in estimating the key ingredients of corporate value – ingredients such as a 
company’s return on invested capital (ROIC), its growth rate, and its weighted average cost 
of capital – can lead to mistakes in valuation and, ultimately, to strategic errors. 
 
                                                 
3
 A note of caution about forward multiples: some analysts forecast future earnings by assuming an industry 
multiple and using the current price to back out the required earnings. As a result, any multiple calculated from 
such data will reflect merely the analyst’s assumptions about the appropriate forward multiple, and dispersion 
(even when warranted) will be nonexistent. 
 
M&A: The Acquisition of GAMESA by ABB 
Álvaro de Freitas                                                                                                                                     Page 19  94 
Of the available valuation tools, a discounted-cash-flow analysis delivers the best results. 
Yet a thoughtful analysis of multiples also merits a place in any valuation tool kit. 
 
1.4 – Most Common Errors in Valuation 
 
Some Valuation Methods are subject to several assumptions considered in their usage. 
Often, some assumptions bias and slight changes can lead to drastically alter the valuation 
results. 
 
Fernandez (2007) highlight in its paper “120 errors in Valuation”, based on more than 1000 
companies, the most common errors in valuation, which we extracted the most important 
ones, to be considered in the valuation works of the proposed transaction where relays this 
thesis: 
 
Table 3 – Most Common Errors in Valuation 
Sources Most Common Errors 




riskness of the 
company 
- Using the historical industry Beta, or the average of the 
Beta’s of similar companies, when the result goes against 
common sense; 
- Using the wrong formula for levering or unlevering the Beta; 
- When Valuing an acquisition using the Beta of the acquiring 
company; 
- The required market risk premium is equal to the historical 
equity premium; 
- The D/E ratio used to calculate WACC is different from to 
the D/E ratio resulting from the valuation; 
- Valuing all the different businesses of a diversified company, 
using the same WACC (same leverage and same ke); 
- Using the wrong formula for the WACC when the value of 
debt is not equal to its book value; 
- Discount the tax shield using the cost of debt or the required 
return to unlevered equity; 






- Considering the increase in the company’s cash position or 
financial investments as an equity cash flow; 
- Errors in the calculation of the taxes that affect the FCF; 
- Expected ECF are not equal to expected dividends plus 
other payments to shareholders (share repurchases); 
- Wrong treatments of seasonal working capital requirements; 
- Wrong treatment of stocks that are cash equivalent; 
- Forgetting balance sheet accounts that affect the cash flows; 
- Exaggerated optimism when forecasting cash flows. 
Errors in the 
calculations of the 
Residual Value 
- Inconsistent cash flow used to calculated perpetuity; 
- Using arithmetic averages instead of geometric averages to 
access growth; 
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Inconsistencies and 
Conceptual Errors 
- Considering the cash in the company as an ECF when the 
companies as no plans to distribute it; 
- Using real cash flows and nominal discount rate, or vice-
versa; 
- Using the average of multiples extracted from transactions 
executed over a very long period of time; 
- Using the average of transactions multiples that have a wide 
scatter; 
- The equity value or the enterprise value does not satisfy the 
time consistency formula; 
- Considering that the value of debt is equal to its book value 
when they are different; 
- Including the value of real options that have no economic 
meaning; 
- Wrong concept of the optimal capital structure; 
- Assumptions about future sales, margins, etc. that are 
inconsistent with the economical environment, the industry 
outlook or competitive analysis; 
- Considered that the ROE is the return to the shareholders. 
Errors when in 
interpreting 
Valuation 
- Confusing Value with Price; 
- A company has the same value for all buyers; 
- Considering that the goodwill includes the brand value and 
the intellectual capital. 
Organizational errors - Commissioning a valuation from an Investment Bank without 
having any involvement in it. 
 
1.5 – Stages in Valuation using DCF 
 
In the figure below, which contain a summary of this topic, being somewhat of a guideline 
for the valuation of each stand alone company involved on the proposed transaction of this 
thesis, aiming to serve as guideline for further works in the appropriate section. In respect 
the assumptions and methodologies it must be looked in the sense of the above described 
topics of this section. 
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Figure 2 
Basic Stages in the performance of a valuation using DCF 
 
Financial Analysis Strategic and Competitive analysis
Evolution of Income Statements and Balance Sheets Evolution of the industry
Evolution of the Cash Flows generated by the company Evolution of the company's competitive position
Evolution of the company's investments Identification of the Value Chain
Evolution of the company's financing Competitive position of the main competitors
Analysis of the financial health Identification of the Value Drivers
Analysis of the business's risk
Financial Forecasts Strategic and competitive forecasts
Income Statements and Balance Sheets Forecast of the industry's evolution
Cash Flows generated by the company Forecast of the company's competitive position
Investments Competitive position of the main competitors
Financing Consitency of the cash flow forecasts
Terminal Value Financial consistency between forecasts
Forecast of various scenarios Comparison of forecasts with historical figures
Consistency of cash flows with the strategic analysis
Net present value as their corresponding rate
Present Value of the Terminal Value
Value of the Equity
Strategic and competitive justification of the value creation
For each business unit and for the company as a whole
Cost of the debt, required return to equity and weighted cost of capital
PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE FLOWS
HISTORIC AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANY AND THE INDUSTRY
Indentification of the value creation. Sustainability of the value creation (time horizon)
Analysis of the value's sensitivity to changes in the fundamental parameters
Benchmarking of the value obtained: comparison with similar companies
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
NET PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE FLOWS
DETERMINATION OF THE COST (Required Return) OF CAPITAL
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As stated in the appropriated topic, the focus in terms of methodology will be the DCF. 
Therefore, below we can find, according to Damodaran, the steps that will serve as 
guideline to decompose value in the proposed transaction, using among others, critical 
concepts that will be describe in the next section of the literature review. 
 
Figure 3 
4 Steps DCF to Decompose Value 
 
A B C D
Target as is Control Premium Acquirer as is Synergy











Value the combined 
firm with synergy 
built in by adjusting 
DCF ingridients in 
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2 - Literature Review on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
 
We assist to an increasingly high production of literature of M&A, especially in the last two 
decades, in consequence of the rising M&A activities as well of the growing complexity of 
the transactions themselves. Therefore, this topic will cover the M&A definitions, types, 
motives, and shareholders’ returns and value creation, in order to create a context of 
understanding of the proposed transaction of this thesis. 
 
2.1 – Definitions and mains concepts 
 
As stated by Nakamura (2005), M&A can be explained by a broad definition, which could 
lead to confusion and misunderstanding as it entails everything from pure mergers to 
strategic alliances. This thesis follows the concept of M&A in a narrow sense, which 
classifies M&A as stated below: 
 
- Mergers as the combination of two or more companies in creation of a new entity 
or formation of a holding company (European Central Bank, 2000, Gaughan, 2002, 
Jagersma, 2005); 
- Acquisitions as the purchase of shares or assets on another company to achieve 
a managerial influence/control (European Central Bank, 2000, Chunlai and Findlay, 
2003), not necessarily by mutual agreement (Jagersma, 2005). 
 
Figure 4 















Source: Nakamura, 2005 
 
Being the purpose of the thesis the study of a merger operation, we will proceed by given 
more details about mergers. Mergers are commonly referred as either merger by 
absorption or establishment (Chen and Findlay, 2003). Merger by absorption is the 
situation in which one company buys all stocks of one or more companies, and the 
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where two or more firms are merged into a newly created one and the combining firms in 
the merger are dissolved. 
 
 According to Nakamura (2005) merger by absorption could be considered as a de facto 
acquisition. Besides, Gaughan (2002) refers that the term “consolidation” could be used to 
imply a merger by establishment. 
 
2.2 – Classification of M&A transactions 
 
We can find in literature from M&A several types and classifications, depending of the 
rational, structure of the deals, but it is appropriate to state about this topic the following 
classification: 
 
Table 4 – M&A Classification by Nature 








Source: Hoang, 2007  
 
Being the types by relationship and economic area more straightforward in terms of 
understanding, and this thesis is focused on a transaction valuation in which the main 
drivers are the value creation, the most common types on this classification are the 
following ones: 
 
- Horizontal M&A – the acquiring and the target companies are competing firms in 
the same industry. According to Chen and Findlay, 2003, horizontal M&A has 
growing rapidly over recent years due to global restructuring of many industries in 
response to technological changes and increase competition; 
- Vertical M&A – are combinations of firms in client-supplier or buyer-seller 
relationships. The firms involved seek to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs 
by upstream or downstream linkages in the supply chain and to benefit from 
economies of scope; 
- Conglomerate M&A – attempt to diversify risks and attain economies of scope by 
engaging in transactions where involving companies that operate in unrelated 
businesses. 
 
2.3 – Motives for M&A transactions 
 
Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and Baker (2003) suggest that there are as many motives for M&A as 
there are bidders and targets. However, grouping the motives of M&A transactions into 
various categories is often useful.  
 
Some common motives for M&A, pointed out the most of the literature, include: 
 
- Means for firms to grow quickly; 
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- Hope to experience economies of scale and scope; 
- A larger firm as a result of a M&A may have a better access to capital market, which 
better leads to a lower cost of capital, i.e., financial benefits; and 
- Anticipated gains which a firm may experience when applying its superior 
management skills to the target’s business. 
 
Nevertheless, all authors, in a broad sense, concur that M&A is driven by many complex 
motives, which can vary from deal to deal and cannot be justified by any single theory or 
approach. 
 
Although the rational can differ from one M&A deal from another, Brigham and Ehrhardt 
(2002) state that the primary motivation for most mergers and acquisitions is to increase 
the value of the combined enterprise.  
 
Empirical evidence cannot say whether mergers, on average, create value (Mukherjee, 
Kiymaz, and Baker, 2003). Although, several empirical studies supports the importance of 
synergy as a merger motive.  
 
2.4 – Valuing Synergies and the Value of Control 
 
Many acquisitions and same large strategic investments are often justified with the 
argument that will create synergies.  
 
What is synergy? Synergy is the additional value that is generate by combining two firms 
creating opportunities that would be available to these firms operating independently. It is 
the most widely used and misused rationale in M&A (Damodaran, 2005). Those synergies 
can be classified into tow categories: 
 
Table 5 – Synergies and Valuation 
Category of 
Synergy 
Types Issues to Valuation 
Operating Synergies 
Allow firms to 
increase their 
operating income 
from existing assets, 
increase growth or 
both 
1. Economies of scale; 
2. Greater Pricing Power; 
3. Combination of different functional strengths; 
4. Higher growth in new or existing markets. 
Can affect margins, returns 
and growth, and trough this 
the value of the firms 
involved in the Merger or 
Acquisition 
Financial Synergies 
The payoff can take 
the form of either 
higher cash flows or a 
lower cost of capital 
(discount rate) or both 
1. A combination of a firm with excess cash, or 
cash slack, and firm with high-return projects can 
yield a payoff in terms of higher value for the 
combined firm; 
2. Debt capacity can increase, because when two 
firms combined, their earnings and cash flows 
may become more stable and predicable;  
3. Tax benefits can arise either from the acquisition 
taking advantage of tax laws to write up the target 
company’s assets or from the use of net operating 
losses to shelter income; 
4. In most publicly traded firms, investors can 
diversify at far lower cost and with more ease 
than the firm itself. 
There most important 
issues related to 
value are related to 
valuing this synergy 
and determining how 
much to pay for it. 
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In this sense, how to value synergy? The key question about synergy is not whether it can 
be valued but how it should be valued. 
 
In a first instance, there are two major questions to be answered: 1) What form is the 
synergy expect to take? 2) When will the synergy start affecting cash flows? 
 
 
Synergy is a stated motive in many mergers and acquisitions. Bhide (1993) examined the 
motives behind 77 acquisitions in 1985 and 1986, and reported that operating synergy was 
the primary motive in one-third of these takeovers. A number of studies examine whether 
synergy exists and, if it does, how much it is worth. If synergy is perceived to exist in a 
takeover, the value of the combined firm should be greater than the sum of the values of 
the bidding and target firms, operating independently. 
 




V(AB) = Value of a firm created by combining A and B (Synergy) 
V(A) = Value of firm A, operating independently 
V(B) = Value of firm B, operating independently 
 
Studies of stock returns around merger announcements generally conclude that the value 
of the combined firm does increase in most takeovers and that the increase is significant. 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) examined a sample of 236 inter-firms tender offers 
between 1963 and 1984 and reported that the combined value of the target and bidder 
firms increased 7.48% ($117 million in 1984 dollars), on average, on the announcement of 
the merger. This result has to be interpreted with caution, however, since the increase in 
the value of the combined firm after a merger is also consistent with a number of other 
hypotheses explaining acquisitions, including under valuation and a change in corporate 
control. It is thus a weak test of the synergy hypothesis. 
 
The existence of synergy generally implies that the combined firm will become more 
profitable or grow at a faster rate after the merger than will the firms operating separately. A 
stronger test of synergy is to evaluate whether merged firms improve their performance 
(profitability and growth) relative to their competitors, after takeovers.  
 
Another concept must be added to the process: the value of control, being this the 
incremental value that an acquirer believes can be created by running a target firm more 
efficiently. Therefore, it is important at this stage that we keep the value of synergy apart 
from the value of control, which is the other widely cited reason for acquisitions.  
 
By separating out the value of control from the value of synergy, two objectives are 
accomplished: 1) we ensure that there is no double counting. For synergy to create value 
there has to be a further increase in return on capital to the combined firm; 2) we can 
devise strategies for acquisition bidding that can differentiate between control and synergy 
value. 
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The issue of valuing synergies also point out the subject of the right price for a target firm. 
In these sense, a fair value acquisition would require that the total price be equal to the 




Breaking the Acquisition Price  
 
 
Source: Damodaran, 2002 
 
 
We can conclude that the acquisition price will determine whether an acquisition is value 
increasing or value destroying to acquiring company’s stockholders.  
 
2.5 – Do M&A create value to shareholders’: and the winner is…? 
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) state that target shareholders gain from virtually every 
acquisition – a result that seems to be unanimously accepted by academics. In a sample of 
151 mergers, Dodd (1980) finds that target shareholders do not vote against the merger 
proposal even once. Yet, Loughran and Vijh (1997) warn that target shareholders who soon 
sell the stock received as payment earn excess returns, while long-term hold strategies 
diminish the potential gains. 
 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) analyze a sample of over 300 deals to conclude that the average 
premium paid for targets is nearly 36%. 
 
To test whether value created is sustainable, Loughran and Vijh (1997) track long-term (5-
year) returns on buy-and-hold strategies from the moment before the deal was announced. 
They conclude that, on average, acquirers earn negative excess returns, but refer also that 





















Book Value of Equity 
of Target firm 
Market Price of target firm prior 
to acquisition 
Acquisition Price of target firm 
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being important drivers, with results that range from value-creation for all intervenient to 
value destruction even for target shareholders. 
 
Bruner (2004) makes a sturdy effort to show that M&A does pay. According to his view, 
empirical studies whose historical period of analysis and sample are not biased, and reach 
statistically significant results, conclude that acquirers usually earn the hurdle rate. 
He sheds light on the heterogeneity of individual deals and how dangerous generalizations 
can be. 
 
In the figure bellow we can find an extract of Bruner (2004) where he point out some 
probable critical points on M&A related to returns to buyers, that should be observed in any 
transaction: 
 
Table 6 - Adjusted Returns to Buyers by “Neighborhood” 
Returns to buyers likely will be higher Returns to buyers likely will be lower 
Strategic Motivation Opportunism Motivation 
Value Acquiring Momentum growth/glamour acquiring 
Credible Synergies Incredible Synergies 
To use excess cash profitably Just to use excess cash 
Buy during cold M&A markets Buy during hot M&A markets 
Pay with cash Pay with stock 
Finance with debt judiciously Over-lever 
Shareholder-oriented management Entrenched management 
Big good deals Big bad deals 
 
The main conclusion is that M&A usually generates positive abnormal results for the 
combined shareholders, suggesting economic value is generated (Bruner, 2004). 
 
The question then becomes how is value going to be shared – knowing the heterogeneity 
that marks these deals, any outcome is possible and depends on how the deal is 
structured/negotiated. 
 
2.6 – Deal structure and form of payment vs. value creation 
 
The main deal-structuring issues in M&A are the mode of acquisition and the form of 
payment. 
Nevertheless, we must take into consideration that the type of M&A and the adequate 
sources of capital are important variables to assess. 
 
At this stage is proper to recover that one of the steps in Acquisition Valuation is to decide 
on payment mechanism: Cash vs. Stock. Damoradoran (2002) stress the following 
conclusion in respect to this: 
 
- Firms which believe that their stock is undervalued and some synergy can be achieved 
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997) will not use stock do to acquisitions; 
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- Firms which believe that their stock is over or correctly valued will use stock to do 
acquisitions; 
- Not surprisingly, the premium paid is larger when an acquisition is financed with stock 
rather than cash; 
- There might be an accounting rationale for using stock as opposed to cash. We are 
allowed to use pooling instead of purchase. 
 
There might also be a tax rationale for using stock. Cash acquisitions create tax liabilities to 
the selling firm’s stockholders. 
 
When considering the stock for stock exchange, we can assume that: 
 
- Correct Exchange Ratio to use in Valuation = Value per Share of Target Firm (with 
control premium and target-controlled synergies)/Value per Share of Bidding Firm; 
- If the exchange ratio is set too high, there will be a transfer of wealth from the bidding 
firm’s stockholders to the target firm’s stockholders; and also in opposite  
 
Despite of the above, we find in the available literature mixed perspectives of the proper 
form of payment.  
 
For instance, Loughran and Vijh, 1997 states that whether it is a merger or a tender offer, 
cash always performs better than stock enhancing the long-term returns for the acquirer. 
When a deal is paid for with stock, only target shareholders earn abnormal returns, mostly 
because of the significant premium they’re usually paid. Yet, Savor and Lu (2009) have 
recently added that results like these should be interpreted with care: it is universally 
accepted that stock issues, in general, suggest overvaluation and timing ability. Therefore, 
stock acquirers are likely to be overvalued and their stock expected to fall in the long run 
anyway. 
The authors find meaningful and statistically significant evidence that stock mergers do 
create value, because the acquirer’s stock is usually more overvalued than the target’s 
assets. They earn negative returns, but not as negative as they would have been 
otherwise.  
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3 – Company and Industry Analysis 
 
3.1 – Company profiles 
 
3.1.1 – ABB 
ABB is one of the largest engineering companies as well as one of the largest 
conglomerates in the world. ABB is traded on the SIX Swiss Exchange in Zurich and the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange in Sweden since 1999, and the New York Stock Exchange in 
the United States since 2001. 
The history of ABB goes back to the late nineteenth century, with the foundation of its 
predecessors (Asea – 1883; Brown Boveri – 1891). In 1988, ASEA and Brown Boveri 
merged, one of the largest operations at the time, to form the new company with 
headquarters in Zurich. The new group had revenues of 17 billion USD and employed 
160,000 people around the world.  
The two merged companies shared broadly the same business areas around the electrical 
engineering and manufacturing (e.g. Products and Solutions for Energy Transmission and 
Distribution, Electrical Turbines, Trains Manufacturing). The business synergies which, 
among other reasons like being market competitors, laid in the merger motives, where 
different areas of focus in power generation. Namely, Asea being one of the major player in 
Nuclear Power Plants and Brown Boveri in Steam and Hydro Power Plants. In summary, 
we can conclude that the starting point of the current company was the merger of two 
companies with same core business, major competitors, with different market scope. 
The post merger growth of the company was sustained in a strong an active M&A activity, 
being, not only the company’s history, but its profile. 
In the early 1990s, ABB purchased Combustion Engineering (C-E), headquartered in 
Stamford and Norwalk, Connecticut, a leading U.S. firm in the development of conventional 
fossil fuel power and nuclear power supply systems to break into the North American 
market. Continuing with its expansion plans, ABB purchased Elsag Bailey, a process 
automation group, in 1997 which included Bailey Controls, Hartmann & Braun, and Fischer 
& Porter. This was the largest acquisition to date in ABB's history. 
ABB bought International Combustion Ltd from Rolls-Royce in 1997. 
ABB's boiler and fossil fuel businesses were purchased by Alstom in 2000, and its nuclear 
business was purchased by Westinghouse Electric Company in 2000. In the same year, 
ABB formally divested from a joint venture named ABB-Alstom Power, and sold its interest 
in conventional power generation systems to Alstom Power.  
In 2001 ABB was ranked as number one on the Dow Jones corporate sustainability index 
for the third year in a row. 
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ABB's Building Systems business unit was sold off in 2004 to Capvis, a Swiss private 
equity company, as part of ABB's strategy to focus on power and automation technologies.  
Financial debt and lingering asbestos liability (indemnity to works as result of law suit) 
brought ABB to the brink of bankruptcy in the early 2000s. In 2006 ABB returned to 
financial health by settling its asbestos liability regarding claims that were filed against 
ABB's U.S. subsidiaries, Combustion Engineering and Lummus Global. In August 2007, 
Lummus Global was sold to CB&I.  
In 2009, ABB realigned its automation divisions to enhance growth opportunities. As of 
January 1, 2010, the business units in the Automation Products and Robotics divisions 
were regrouped into two new divisions – Discrete Automation and Motion, and Low Voltage 
Products. The Process Automation division remained unchanged except for the addition of 
the instrumentation business from the Automation Products division. 
In 2011, ABB acquired Baldor Electric USA for $4.2 billion in an all-cash transaction. 
On January 30th, 2012, ABB Group acquired Thomas & Betts in a $3.9 billion cash 
transaction.  
Currently the company has the following Business Structure as described as follows: 
Business Divisions 
Power Products 
Power Products are the key components to transmit and distribute electricity. The division 
incorporates ABB's manufacturing network for transformers, switchgear, circuit breakers, 
cables, and associated equipment. It also offers all the services needed to ensure products' 
performance and extend their lifespan. The division is subdivided into three business units. 
Power Systems 
Power Systems offers turnkey systems and services for power transmission and 
distribution grids, and for power plants. Substations and substation automation systems are 
key areas. Additional highlights include flexible alternating current transmission systems 
(FACTS), high-voltage direct current (HVDC) systems and network management systems. 
In power generation, Power Systems offers the instrumentation, control and electrification 
of power plants. The division is subdivided into four business units. 
Discrete Automation and Motion 
This division provides products, solutions and related services that increase industrial 
productivity and energy efficiency. Its motors, generators, drives, programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs), power electronics and robotics provide power, motion and control for a 
wide range of automation applications. The leading position in wind generators and a 
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growing offering in solar complement the industrial focus, leveraging joint technology, 
channels and operations platforms. The division is subdivided into four business units. 
Low Voltage Products 
The Low Voltage Products division manufactures low-voltage circuit breakers, switches, 
control products, wiring accessories, enclosures and cable systems to protect people, 
installations and electronic equipment from electrical overload. The division further makes 
KNX systems that integrate and automate a building's electrical installations, ventilation 
systems, and security and data communication networks. The division is subdivided into 
five business units. 
Process Automation 
The main focus is to provide customers with products and solutions for instrumentation, 
automation and optimization of industrial processes. The industries served include oil and 
gas, power, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, pulp and paper, metals and minerals, marine 
and turbo charging. Key customer benefits include improved asset productivity and energy 








The figures above shows how balanced the business is either by region or division. 
Results 2011 by Business Divisions
figures in million USD






Revenues 10.869 8.101 8.806 5.304 8.300
% total revenues 26% 20% 21% 13% 20%
EBIT 1.476 548 1.294 904 963
% Revenues 13,6% 6,8% 14,7% 17,0% 11,6%
Employees 35.000 19.500 27.500 21.000 28.500  
 
Source: Company’s annual report  
Note: Disclosed revenues by Business Divisions didn’t take into account interdivisional revenues eliminations. 
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(figures in millions USD otherwise indicated) 2008 2009 2010 2011 CAGR (%)
Orders 38.282 30.969 32.681 40.210 1,65%
Revenues 34.912 31.795 31.589 37.990 2,86%
EBIT 4.552 4.126 3.818 4.667 0,84%
   as % of revenues 12,1% 13,0% 13,0% 12,3% 0,51%
Net Income 3.118 2.901 2.561 3.168 0,53%
Basic EPS ($) 1,36 1,27 1,12 1,38 0,49%
proposed DPS (CHF) 0,48 0,51 0,60 0,65 10,63%
Cash Flow from Operations 3.958 4.027 4.197 3.612 -3,00%
Free Cash Flow 2.888 3.089 3.397 2.593 -3,53%
   as % of net income 93% 106% 133% 82% -4,17%
Return on capital employed 31% 27% 21% 14% -23,28%
Number of Employees 120.000 116.000 116.500 133.600 3,64%
Total ABB Group Key Figures 2008-2011
 
Source: Company’s Annual Reports 
 
 Revenues had a YoY variation from 2010 to 2011 of 20% achieving double-
digit orders and revenue growth. 40 billion USD orders for first time ever, 
record revenues revealing a strong recovery after a slowing pace during 2009 
and 2010; 
 
 Operating Income 
EBIDTA margin growth on the period 2008-2011 was around 0.9%, being the 
EBIT margin in 2011 slightly penalized by an important increase in 









Currently, ABB maintain one referent 
shareholders that had control of the 
form company ASEA. 
 
A huge stack of the company is in free 
float 
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      Source: company information 
 
 Free Cash Flow 
 
The recent trend of increase was inverted between 2010 and 2011, due to a 
high capital spending, mainly in property, plant and equipment and intangible 
assets, and in net working capital. Capital expenditure in 2011 was around 1 
billion USD (2.6% of total revenues). In this sense, the CAGR of the period 
2008-2011 was -3,53%.   
 
 Return on Capital Employed 
 
The company has established 2015 target for this indicator by >20%. In 2011, 
this ratio shows an impact of Baldor acquisition. 
 
 ABB’s balance sheet retains its strong investment grade: 
 
o Average debt duration now >5 years; 
o Moody’s and S&P reaffirmed A/A2 rating with stable outlook after 
Thomas & Betts acquisition announcement. 
 
 
 The evolution of the dividend payout shows a 
steadily rising, sustainable annual dividend 
throughout the business cycle; 
 
 8% dividend increase vs. 2010, equivalent to 
47% payout ratio, 3% yield. 
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   3.1.2 – GAMESA CORPORACIÓN TECNOLÓGICA 
The company was founded in 1976 under the name of Grupo Auxiliar Metalúrgico, initially 
operating in the manufacturing and sale of industrial machinery and equipment, in the 
automotive sector and Defense and worked on the development of new technologies for 
emerging businesses such as robotics, microelectronics, the environment, and for the  
and composite materials.  
Over the years, a process which intensified in the 1990s, the company began to focus its 
business model on two discrete fronts: renewable energies and aeronautics. In early 
90’s, two referent shareholder’s entered in Gamesa, BBVA and Iberdrola, by the vehicle 
IBV detained by 50% each. For them, Gamesa represented a company with potential for 
being the business platform for their new aeronautic, wind and solar projects.  
In 1994 Gamesa embarks on the engineering, design, manufacture and sale of wind 
turbines. The political interest to increase penetration of wind power in Spain, mainly to 
take advantage of its potential to boost the Spanish industry sector, with the 
consequence of reduction of the cronical structural unemployment, turned necessary to 
Gamesa incorporate a technological partner which could supply knowledge in this 
business in order to follow this market dynamics. Therefore, it was created the Business 
Unit Gamesa Eolica being its shareholder’s Gamesa (51%), Vestas (40%) and the 
Regional Government of Navarra (9%)4. It is important to state that this partnership was 
limited to the boundaries of the Spanish market. 
In 1993 Gamesa began working on its first aeronautic program for the EMBRAER. 
The entry into the business of developing and construction of wind farms was performed 
in 1995, relaying into the 1st wind farm start up in 1996. The inclusion of the sale of wind 
farms in this business segment was performed in the early 2000s, being further one its 
core business, therefore excluding the model of Independent Power Producer (IPP). In 
this sense, this business segment is a strategic vehicle to pursue the main activity of 
selling wind turbines, increasing in importance on the revenue generation of the 
company. 
The company’s presence in the renewable energy sector was rounded out by the 
manufacture of thermo solar and photovoltaic components and the development and sale 
of photovoltaic solar parks, as well as facilities powered by other renewable energy 
sources such as biomass and mini hydro.  
The other business line, aeronautics, entailed participation in programs for the 
manufacture of aircraft systems, the development of the engineering blueprints for the 
design, manufacture and production of parts using composite materials. Gamesa’s 
niches were the regional jet segment (capacity for <100 passengers), projects for major 
                                                 
4 Currently Gamesa still have located an important share of its manufacturing facilities in this Spanish Region. 
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aircraft makers and the helicopter segment. During this phase, the company developed 
projects alongside aircraft makers of the likes of Embraer, Bombardier and Airbus.  
In order to finance its growth strategy, Gamesa performed its IPO on 31 October of 2000 
being one of the best-performing in the history of the Spanish stock market, rallying 
72.5% during its first trading session, being included in 2001 in the benchmark Spanish 
blue chip index, the Ibex 35. The IPO marked an inflection point in Gamesa’s business 
trajectory, prompting it to begin to shift its growth strategy towards technology put to the 
service of renewable energy, particularly wind power.  
Aiming its geographical expansion and growth, being the joint-venture agreement with 
Vestas not allowing this purpose, in 2002 this partnership was dissolved by purchase by 
Gamesa total capital of Gamesa Eolica. Further, Gamesa expands its international 
footprint, engaging in wind farm projects and selling of wind turbines in countries such as 
Portugal, Italy, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, UK, US, China and Mexico. 
In June of 2002, the company changed its name to Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica. 
Due to consequences, in particular to the aeronautic sector, of the 09.11 attacks prompt 
Gamesa to abandon its aeronautic business unit in an MBO deal.  
Currently, Gamesa’s group is divided into 4 business units: 
Wind Turbines 
The company has its own wind turbine design and development capacity and it is 
vertically integrated; Gamesa covers the entire process from conception, manufacturing 
and installation of wind generators, including manufacturing of blades, moulds, blade 
roots, multipliers, generators, converters and towers, as well as assembly, logistics and 
installation. 
 
Gamesa has more than thirty production facilities in Spain (supplying mainly the 
European market), the US, Asia (China and India) and Brazil (since mid-2011). Its sales 
network, distributed in 8 regions and 24 sales offices worldwide, covers many European 
countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Turkey and the United Kingdom), North America (USA and Mexico), Brazil, 
China, India, Japan, Singapore and several North African countries such as Morocco and 
Egypt. 
In 2010, Gamesa undertook a review of its production capacity which resulted in the 
reduction of 500 MW of blade capacity in Spain and an increase in capacity in other 
countries by investing in growth markets such as China, India and Brazil. 
The company has launched an ambitious plan to develop three new onshore Wind 
Turbine Generator product families and two new offshore platforms. Gamesa will also 
increase engineering hours (to 1.5 million hours/year), double R&D staff by 2013 and 
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open five new technology centers in Virginia (US) and Glasgow (UK), both focused on 
offshore, as well as India, Singapore (advanced materials research) and Brazil, to make a 
total of ten worldwide. 
 
Source: Company information 
Wind Farms 
By the end of 2011, Gamesa had completed over 200 wind farms in 11 countries, with a 
total installed capacity of around 5,000 MW, and another 22,000 MW in various stages of 
development in Europe, America and Asia. 
Gamesa's wind farm development division undertakes all the activities associated with wind 
generation projects, including site identification, wind measurement, obtaining the 
necessary permits and licenses for wind farm construction and commissioning, final sale of 
wind farms, and operation and maintenance of operational farms. 
The company's strategy in this segment is strengthening its position in areas with high 
energy consumption, expanding in emerging markets and obtaining new customers, 
steadily building out its portfolio (alone or through alliances with local partners) and rotation 
of assets (through recurring farm sales) depending on projects' earnings visibility and 
profitability and on the basis of the needs of its customers: large utilities that need to 
expand in new markets; local developers or industrial groups that need know-how and wish 
to share risks and funding in the process of wind farm development, and financial 
institutions seeking returns and experience in the sector. 
Nowadays, Gamesa in this segment has its activity through its company Gamesa Energy in 
the following countries: Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Poland, Greece, France, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Sweden, UK, USA, Dominican Republic, Mexico, India and China. 
















2008 2009 2010 2011
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Gamesa's end-to-end offering in the wind turbine manufacturing business is complemented 
by comprehensive range of operation and maintenance services of currently 14,000 MW 
under maintenance for over 130 clients. 
Operation and maintenance are essential to value creation, availability and optimal returns 
on wind farms because they contribute to: 1) Optimizing wind farm output and returns by 
maximizing availability; 2) Guaranteeing a useful life, in optimal conditions, of at least 20 
years (generator life cycle) and even extending its useful life through a program of 
improvements and adaptations implemented in the final years of the life cycle; 3) 
Compliance with changes in existing technical standards or new technical or economic 
regulations. 
Currently there are more than 30 Regional Operating Centers in Europe (Spain, Portugal, 
France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the UK, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania), 
the US, Mexico, Asia (China, India and Japan) and Africa (Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt), 
which guarantee proximity and permanent availability of the wind farms under 
maintenance. 
New Businesses  
In the search for the new business opportunities and energy solutions that will contribute to 
sustainable growth in the medium and long term, Gamesa is developing and analyzing new 
technologies and markets as a diversification strategy with the goal of identifying and 
investing in innovative companies. 
To channel this new strategy, Gamesa established a corporate venture capital fund -
Gamesa Venture Capital-, through which it will invest up to 50 million euros in the next four 
years to buy stakes, initially minority holdings, in start-up or growth companies engaged in 
the development of technologies promising the highest potential for future growth. The 
productive and sales bases are concentrated in leading markets, more specifically in 
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A new offshore manufacturing plant is planned for the UK, where currently is installed a 
R&D center, for taking advantage of the growing opportunity of this segment for being this 
greatest market in the upcoming years. 
  
The main clients of Gamesa have been, during the growth stage of the company, the main 
operators of Wind Power, more specifically, Utilities and Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs), with a major stake on the first one. Recently, we assist to a growing importance of 
the IPPs and increasing entering of a new type of player who are looking to this sector as a 
way to seek profitability and return on its investment strategy. For instance, during 2010, 
Gamesa performed several deals with companies such as investment funds, private equity, 
insurance companies, and IKEA! 
 
Workforce 











This production structure explain, in 
some sense, the workforce geographical 
distribution of the company, being most 
of it characterized by two criteria’s: 
located in Spain (Headquarters) and 
allocated to manufacturing facilities. 
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The competitive position of Gamesa has 
been tightening in the recent years, as 
well as the referent companies (Vestas 
and General Electric) of the sector, 
mainly to the increase position of the 
Chinese Manufactures, which 4 main 
players representing 32% of the 2010 
sales.  
 
Wind Turbine Manufacturer 


































Iberdrola is the referent shareholder of 
the company, and has been a key 
customer of the company.  
 
An important stake of shares is in free 
float. 
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Market and Financial Data 
 
Gamesa's share price has fallen by over 44% during 2011, and is hovering near all time 
lows and following a tendency verified in last years in a clear signal of underperformance. 
Looking at its fundamentals seems that despite of relative good positioning in the wind 
market as well as sustained execution the market is strongly penalizing the shares in terms 
of its market value. Even though, the company market performance is in line, for the same 
period, with the verified tendency of its market benchmark, the IBEX 35. 
2008 2009 2010 2011
CAGR            
(08-11)
Revenues 3.646 3.187 2.736 3.033 -6,0%
EBITDA 495 394 328 364
EBITDA Margin 13,6% 12,4% 12,0% 12,0%
EBIT 208 177 119 131
EBIT Margin 5,7% 5,6% 4,3% 4,3%
Net Income 157 115 50 51
Net Income Margin 4,3% 3,6% 1,8% 1,7%
NFD -140 259 -210 710
NFD/EBITDA -0,3x 0,7x -0,6x 2,0x
EPS (in euros) 1,32 0,47 0,21 0,21 -45,8%







 Revenues increased between 2010 and 2011 by 10.9% inverting the decreasing 
tendency verified since 2008, not enough to reach a period 2008-2011 of declining 
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growth. This increase is justified by growth in wind turbine sales of around 400 MW 
and wind farms (100 M€). After the big boom of wind power market in 2008 (when 
Gamesa took advantage of its great market power in Spain) the further decrease in 
revenues are explained, in a broad sense, by difficulties in penetrate in growing 
markets, revealing problems to put in practice its internationalization program; 
 EBIT – despite of the increase in value from 2010 to 2011, we observe a 
downward trend (-14,3%) in margin due to the pricing pressure experience in 
markets like China and the rump-up of the new products platforms. There were a 
number of non-recurrent factors included in this margin like part of the impact of the 
cost-saving plan (~5 M€) and close to 30 M€ in stocks provisions for highly 
obsolete components in the balance sheet. 
 Net Financial Debt (NFD) did not surpass in 2011 the x2.0 EBIDTA in line with the 
guidance established for the year, accounting 710 M€. The increase of NFD in 
respect to 2010, is due to the following factors:  
o Wind Turbine Division: 2010 => -405 M€; 2011 => 272 M€ (∆ +677 M€) 
Main justification are related to the investment needs to accommodate the new manufacturing 
international facilities and work in progress of turbines. 
o Wind Farm Division: 2010 => 196 M€; 2011 => 483 M€ (∆ +287 M€) 
The increase of the level of NFD is due to the strong increase in construction of wind farms 
with deliveries expected for 2012. Looking to the evolution of the level of net debt in the recent 
years we can conclude that this business implies a 2-year cash investment cycle. 
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3.2 – Industry Review 
 
Over the last years we assist to a considerable growth of wind power installed capacity, 
especially in the last four years, where the installations represented around 60% of the total 
cumulative installed capacity. This implies, taking into account other factors, that this 
industry is moving towards a mature stage, economical sustainable and being closer in 



























Geographically, Europe supported the main share of global wind power growth, either in 
installed capacity and components industry, being this a strong argument for most of the 
European government to spread the message of wind power not only being sustainable as 
for environmental concerns, but as well by its economical an value added contribution.  
 
A number of traditionally solid markets experienced a big slow down in growth notably 
Spain, Denmark and Germany. China’s total capacity grew to 54 GW5, after the country 
gained about the same and new capacity in 2010, around 16 GW. The US is reaching a 
good, installing 6.7 GW in 2011, up from 5 GW in 2010. 
Two markets performed exceptionally well in 2011. Brazil grew by 476 MW to nearly 1.4 
GW, a growth of 53% from 2010’s installed capacity. Romania, which at the beginning of 
                                                 
5
 1 GW =1.000 MW 
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2010 totaled only 14 MW, now stands at 982 MW. Such performance should see these 
markets described as “mainstream” rather than “emerging”. 
 
One of the main business drivers of the market, where the potential for growth is higher, 
relays on offshore. At the end 2011, represented around 1.5% of the total wind power 
installed capacity, being UK its biggest market with more than 50% of share. 
 
The major constraint for the modest penetration of this segment was more than the double 
in terms of investment in face of onshore. The trend for lower growth in onshore, revenues 
support, and technological improvements focus by the main manufacturers, will lead 
offshore to the same level of potential that was assisted in onshore especially in the last 
decade. 
 
In respect to the players profiles, and despite of the ranking presented on the Gamesa’s 
company profile, we can state that the current players described as the pioneers, still 
operating in the market, where the ones that developed the technology and the market, 
being their importance progressively reduced with the entrance on the market of big 
electrical divisions of big conglomerates. Those recognized the attractiveness of this 
market by its direct business potential as well as the high cross selling with their original 
core 6products.  
 
It is important to notice that the current so called “Local” manufacturers, mainly Chinese, 
relay their high market share on the boom assisted on their domestic markets, putting in 
place their internationalization program.  
 
Main Players in the industry, 2009 (market share; size) 
 
 
Source: Companies, BTM, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
                                                 
6 The entrance on the market by the conglomerates where performed by acquisitions of the so called pioneers. 
This is illustrated by the acquisition in 2004 of the Danish manufacturer Bonus by Siemens, and the acquisition in 
2007 of Spanish manufacturer Ecotécnia by Alstom. 
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The market, achieving a mature stage, will naturally moves to a higher degree of 
concentration in some big players, mainly through M&A, leading to a market structure of 
oligopoly.  
 
As we can observe in the figure below, the market was moving in terms of increasing 
importance of Utilities and IPP’s, decreasing the relevance of investors that where present 
in the big boom of the sector on the high growth period, seeking high returns on a short 
period of time. 
 




Source: Companies, BTM, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
 
Currently the trend is shifting on this field. The entrance of pension and insurance funds as 
confirmed offshore wind’s move from balance-sheet Utility financing to a new phase of 
consortium-based investment. The recent 1.3 billion USD investment by Danish insurance 
groups in offshore wind in Denmark confirms the trend towards a maturing market and the 
creation of secondary markets with assets sold for a second or third time. In conclusion, we 
can state that the market is moving for the next level that means that funding is constrained 
and is going to have to come from new equity sponsors. 
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Source: Companies, BTM, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
 
The average cost of the onshore wind turbines fell in real terms from 2 MM €/MW in 1980s 
to 0.88 MM €/MW in 2011, being one of the most important factor affecting the Cost of 
Energy (CoE).  
 
On the early stage and in most of the markets today, the wind power has a regulated 
framework, serving the purpose of being, among other things for being a renewable source 
of energy, an incentive to the technology progression. Moving to a even more mature 
stage, is most likely that the common frameworks will be abandoned being wind power 
moving to full competition with another sources of energy production. The most common 
framework of incentive schemes are the following: 
 
Feed-in Tariff (FiT) – fixed and granted tariff for each MWh produced, during the wind farm 
useful life. Exist as a mechanism of supporting a new technology and/or the sector has an 
important role in the local industry. 
 
Electricity Market prices + Green Certificates (GC) – selling the energy produced in the 
electricity market (spot) plus an incentive granted in the way of a certificated issued by 
being renewable energy. 
 
Bilateral Agreements – agreements for the remuneration scheme established with the 
purchaser of the produced energy (usually Utilities). Usually these agreements constitute 
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one part of the scheme being added by others like loan guarantee program, manufacturing 
tax credits, treasury cash grants, etc. 
 
Tenders – scheme to boost the share of renewable sources by establishment Power 
Purchase Agreement (PPA) with producers that bid for granting it, and therefore assuring a 
downward trend of prices. 
 
It’s important to notice that, especially in European Countries, with the current public debt 
issues, is in place a growing social and economic pressure to force the abandon of any 
kind of incentives to renewable energy, although most of them adopt the European 
Directive 20207 that establish ambitious renewable targets. Taking into account the 
installed capacity in 2010, 84 GW, these targets represents an increase of over 150% 
reaching an aggregate total of 213 GW. In conclusion, for the European market, is 
expected an annual installations between 12-13 GW until 2020. 
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that on the basis of the US’s existing 
subsidies policies, the US could have accumulative total installed wind capacity by 2020 of 
92 GW, which represents a 129% increase over 2010’s figure of 40 GW. In conclusion, for 
the US market, is expected an annual installations around 5 GW until 2020. 
 
China has a current informal target for wind capacity cumulative installations of 225 GW in 
2020, which represents a 432% increase of 2010’s figure of 42 GW. Therefore, for this 
market, is expected an annual installations around 18 GW up to 2020. 
 
For the Rest of the World (ROW), is assumed a growth rate out to 2020 which is the same 
as the weighted average for the EU, US, and China. This takes cumulative installations 
from 28 GW in 2010 to 89 GW in 2020, an increase of 218%. This implies annual 
installations of 6 GW. 
 
After a geographical assessment of expected growth is important to point out that, the 
onshore capacity installations trend to became stable in the upcoming years, being offshore 
the main driver of growth resulting in a average of 4% for total wind power installed 
capacity until 2020. 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the main forward drivers of the industry will probably lead 
to the following conclusions: 
 
1) Short-term demand is being hampered by the weak global economy and doubts about 
the sustainability of US and European debt. In the short term, weaker demand in mature 
markets (Europe and US) is being offset by the growth in emerging markets in Asia (e.g. 
India), Latin America (Brazil, Mexico), Africa (South Africa, Egypt, Morocco) and Australia, 
which need to deal with structural energy deficits or excessive dependence on a single 
domestic energy source; 
                                                 
7
 The European Union has a target of deriving 20% of all its energy from renewable sources by 2020, as 
mandated by Directive 2009/28/EC.   
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2) However, commitments to renewable energy at the European (20-20-20 directive) and 
global level, along with the growing competitiveness of wind energy should guarantee 
growth rates of 10%-20% in new facilities between 2011 and 20158; 
 
3) The sector in the midst of far-reaching restructuring (surplus capacity of 30%, 
technological innovation), which is pushing down, among other things, prices and 
squeezing margins. Moreover, the sector is at a crucial crossroads with the market 
becoming increasingly global and competitive.  
 
4) We can expect a natural selection process in which only the best will survive (China has 








                                                 
8 According to BTM Consult, Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), International Energy Agency (IEA). 
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4 – Standalone Valuation 
 
In this topic it’s performed the standalone valuation of each company included in the 
proposed transaction. The valuation is performed base on the following: 
 
Gamesa: The method used, as described in the Literature Review section, will be the DCF 
approach. For this, was considered a scenario analysis from 2012 to 2016, being this 
period representative of the growth stage. Further, a stable growth is forecasted from 2017 
to 2020. It was considered the Free Cash Flow to the Firm, as the cash flows applied to the 
DCF method, discounted at the WACC. 
 
ABB: the main method, following the terms applied to Gamesa valuation, will be 
complemented with a relative valuation for comparison proposals. 
 
All cash flows will be discounted to 2011 base year. 
 
4.1 – Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica 
 
In respect to the industry drivers, the challenges to Gamesa, and reflected in its Business 
Plan 2011-2013, published in October 2010, will be:  
 
1) Technology: product platforms aimed at providing the right price-quality trade-off 
both onshore and offshore; the need to cut energy costs and reduce dependency 
on incentives (-15% in 2011, -20% in 2013, -30% in 2015) 
 
2) International expansion: flexibility in getting in and out of markets swiftly (e.g. 
India and Brazil); expanded sales & marketing reach (Australasia, South Africa, 
Middle East);  
 
3) Increased productivity: capacity cuts of 50% in Spain, +1,000 MW in core 
markets, completion of the process of setting a local supply chain in India and 
Brazil; cost streamlining (-15% overhead/MW by 2013 vs. -5% in 2011);  
 
4) Financial capacity (2.5x debt/EBITDA, €1.2bn refinancing achieved in June-11 
covers Capex requirements to 2013);  
 
5) Exploitation of other competitive advantages: Gamesa Energy9 as demand 
driver (25% of total WTG demand) in China, India and USA; O&M division (10%e 
of total WTG sales, €300mn 2012, margins higher than in the wind business). 
 
Currently it’s outstanding the below targets for the key financial data of the company: 
 
                                                 
9 Group’s company responsible for the Development and Sales of Wind Farms. 
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Guidance 2012 Business Plan 2013
Turbines (MW) sold 2.800-3.200 4.000
EBIT Margin 2%-4% 6%-7%
Working Capital/Revenues 20-25% 20%
Total Capex (M €) 275 310
Net debt/EBITDA 2.5x 2.5x
 
Source: Company information 
 
Assumptions to financial forecasts and Valuation10 
 




Volumes are based on Gamesa’s guidance and taking into account the forecasts of 
industry volume progression, in the most relevant markets to the company. Therefore, the 
turbines that will be delivered in the period 2012-2015 will be in the range of 3,000-
3,600MW. It was also considered Gamesa’s lower exposure to US market, in comparison 
to other key manufacturers (e.g. Gamesa 2011: 15% vs. Vestas 35%), reflecting a less 
fallout from the US slowdown in 2013, with overall volumes slightly ahead in 2012. 
Thereafter, I we expect low single-digit growth (around 6%) as developing-world volumes 
offset stagnation in more mature markets. 
 
For Valuation purposes, 2 additional scenarios were forecasted (Bullish and Bearish) 
reflecting high and low expectation relative to the above assumptions to the Base case. 
 
Average Selling Price (ASP) 
 
Following a trend of continuing oversupply and pricing pressure in the turbine market in the 




The company will struggle to raise EBIT margins above the 2011’s level of 4.3% in the 
medium term, mainly due to: 
 
1) Capex necessities for putting in practice its offshore program and new onshore 
platforms; 
2) Market price pressures; 
                                                 
10 Figures in Appendix 
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3) Operational restructuring in force will be visible only in terms of its benefits from 
2014 afterwards; 
4) Some difficulties in putting in place, in the short-term, a overseas production 
capacity, reducing the current weight of facilities in Spain; 
5) 32% of the 2011 ending backlog coming from Latin America, where the margins 
are squeezed by prices observed mainly in the Brazilian last tenders.   
 
In this sense, it was forecasted that the company reaches at the end of its growth stage a 
EBIT margin of 4.5%. 
 
Also, in this item where constructed two additional scenarios that will be linked with the 




In average, our expectations of CAPEX in period 2012-2015 will be lower than Gamesa 
targets of €250m a year between 2011 and 2013, including both PPE and intangibles, 
which we expect to be the out -turn. Gamesa is now bringing forward a range of new 
turbines (onshore 4,5–5 MW and offshore 5-7 MW) representing a good allocation of 
resources, given the company’s lack of track record in offshore and the relative advantages 
of the market incumbents Siemens and Vestas. 
 
Depreciation and Net Working Capital 
 
The estimates of depreciation where linked to the volumes of forecasted CAPEX, assuming 
the past relation. To the level of Working Capital, and consequently its net change, was 
considered estimates from Redburn Research. 
 
b) Discount Rate 
 
Risk-free rate 4,0%
Market risk premium 4,5%
Beta Unlevered 1,2 Electrical Equipment Unlevered Beta (Damodaran, 2012)
Beta Levered 1,5




Cost of debt 7,0%
Tax 28,0%
WACC 9,3%
UBS Equity Research Feb/2012 estimates
According to formula [3]
According to formula [17]
According to formula [15]
WACC Calculation parameters
UBS Equity Research Feb/2012 estimates
UBS Equity Research Feb/2012 estimates
Target D/E ratio, own estimates
Marginal tax rate, for Basque Region (Spain)
Target Debt Ratio
Risk-free rate+Credit Spread
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Year of forecast 10
According to formula [22]: Value = expected cash flow next period/(r-g)
Terminal Value parameters












  Bullish 1.738 1.007 4,08
17%
  Base Case 1.594 863 3,50
-10%
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4.2 - ABB 
 
In November 2011, ABB announced an updated strategy for the period 2011-2015 along 
with financial targets to measure the success in achieving them:  
Organic Revenue Growth (CAGR) 7-10%
Operational EBITDA (margin corridor) 13-19%
Organic EPS Growth (CAGR) 10-15%
Free Cash Flow Conversion annual avg. >90%




Power Products 5-7% 14-20%
Power Systems 10-14% 7-11%
Discrete Motion and Automation 12-15% 16-21%
Low Voltage Products 8-11% 16-22%
Process Automation 6-9% 11-15%
ABB - Target Revenue Growth and Operational EBITDA Margin Corridor 2011-2015
ABB - Group Targets (2011-2015)
 
Source: Company information 
CAGR: Compounded Annual Growth Rate, base year 2010 
 
The long term outlook for ABB remains positive, with utilities continuing to invest in grid 
upgrades and industries investing more in automation solutions to increase energy 
efficiency and productivity. 
 
Macroeconomic volatility makes short-term forecasts more challenging. There are signs of 
recovery in the North American Economy and China appears to be returning to a focus on 
growth, while uncertainty around government budget deficit in Europe remains high. From 
the perspective of ABB’s short-term business development, management expects low 
single digit growth in most of its early-cycle business until confidence in the macroeconomic 
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2010 2015
Services 16% ~20% - 25%





19% ~25% - 30%
- Leverage installed base.
- Inverters, mechanical equipments;
- Renewables, energy, automation and smart 
grids.
- China; India; Africa;
- More Automation and base order in Power.
- North America Low Voltage and Discrete 
Motion expansion;
- Power, smart grids, energy efficiency.
% sales
Focus/AreasKey Areas
Strategic Focus on Future Growth
 
Source: Company information 
 
Management stated that, they will continue to drive further improvements in costs and 
productivity going forward.  
 
The company closed 2011 with the current status of order backlog, an important indicator 





Power Products 8.226 7.930 8.029
Power Systems 9.675 10.929 11.570
Discrete Automation and Motion 3.046 3.350 4.120
Low Voltage Products 734 838 887
Process Automation 5.523 5.530 5.771
Operating Divisions 27.204 28.577 30.377
Corporate and Others* -2.433 -2.384 -2.869
Total 24.771 26.193 27.508
* includes interdivional eliminations  
Source: Annual Report 2011 
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In 2011, orders grew at a higher rate than revenues leading to an increase in group order 
backlog by 5% compared to 2010. 
 
In general terms, the assumptions for revenues targets, stated above, are as follows: 
 
- World GDP to grow 3-4% p.a.11; 
- Emerging Markets (EM) growth >2x developed markets; 
- Global industrial capex to grow 5-6% p.a.; 
- ABB’s markets assumed to grow 6% CAGR over 2010-2015. 
 
We assumed three scenarios of revenues: 
 
- Base case: the average of the group’s corridor revenues target for the period 2011-
2015 as benchmark for the CAGR (%) of 2010-2015; 
- Bullish: +1% of the group’s higher corridor limit of revenues target 2011-2015 as 
benchmark for the CAGR (%) of 2010-2015; 
- Bearish: -1% of the group’s lower corridor limit of revenues target 2011-2015 as 
benchmark for the CAGR (%) of CAGR 2010-2015. 
 
 
Source: Company information; own estimations. 
 
For the long-term, we forecasted for the period 2016-2020 a revenue growth of 4%, and in 
perpetuity 3%, in line with the GDP long-term expectations. As stated in the Literature 
Review section, the long-term growth should not overpass the expectation for this 
macroeconomic aggregate. The overall ABB’s business portfolio is strongly linked with the 
economic growth and their components, especially the investment, mainly in industry 
sector. 
 
Mixing the business targets of the company and their past track record in the cost 
components of his income, we assume that the trend will be replied for the upcoming years. 
Therefore, the cost and margins where forecasted as the average of the historical year 
ended figures. 
 
                                                 
11 Global Insight 






Bullish - - 41.413 44.947 48.442 52.719 
YoY growth - - 9% 9% 8% 9% 
Base Case 31.589 37.990 39.738 42.139 44.018 46.248 
YoY growth -1% 20% 5% 6% 4% 5% 
Bearish - - 37.741 39.309 40.572 41.464 
YoY growth - - -1% 4% 3% 2% 
5% 
3% 
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Costs and Earnings Assumptions
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012-2015 2016-2018 2019-2020
Total Revenue (mn USD) 29.183 34.912 31.795 31.589 37.990
- COGS (% of revenue) 69,3% 68,7% 70,7% 69,8% 69,9%
- Operating Exp. (% of revenue) 17,0% 16,7% 17,4% 18,0% 17,8%
- SG&A (% of revenue) 15,0% 14,8% 15,3% 15,8% 15,1% 14,7% 14,6% 14,5%
- EBIDTA (% of revenue) 15,7% 16,6% 14,0% 14,4% 15,0% 15,6% 15,7% 15,8%
- D&A (% of revenue) 2,1% 1,9% 2,1% 2,2% 2,6% 2,7% 2,8% 2,9%







Source: company information; own estimations 
 
ABB
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Current Assets 23.145 24.347 25.229 25.348 23.787
Excess Cash (-) 8.110 7.806 9.552 8.610 5.767
Current Liabilities (-) 14.479 16.004 14.579 16.738 16.561
Short Term Debt (+) 536 354 161 1.043 765
Working capital 1.092 891 1.259 1.043 2.224
% of Revenue 3,7% 2,6% 4,0% 3,3% 5,9%
Interest Exp (net) 559 664 248 78 117
Total Debt 3.266 2.975 3.016 2.755 4.555
Execess Cash (-) 8.110 7.806 9.552 8.610 5.767
Net Debt -4.844 -4.831 -6.536 -5.855 -1.212
Values in mn USD
Historical Working Capital and Net Debt
 
The net debt in 2011 increased, in respect to the previous years, mainly due to the 
acquisition of Baldor in cash of around 3,800 million USD, implying also an increase in the 
levels of working capital. For the long-term, we assumed a level of working capital of the 
last year (5.9% of revenues), after group market consolidation by strong activity of M&A.  
 
For the DCF valuation, the parameters used for the appropriate discount rate (WACC) are 
as follows: 
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Parameter %
Risk-free rate 1,87%
Market risk premium 6,0%
Beta Unlevered 1,35
Beta Levered 1,5









Market D/E ratio. Electrical Equipment Industry Average. Source: Damodaran, 2012
Spread Applied to Credit Rating A2 Moody's; A S&P
Risk-free rate+Credit Spread
Forecast of Global Economic Growth. Source: The Conference Board-Economic Global 
Economic Outlook, 2012.
US T-Bond Rate. Source: Damodaran, 2012
Electrical Equipment Unlevered Beta. Source: Damodaran, 2012
Implied target Equity Ratio from target D/E
Marginal tax rate, for Zurich (Switzerland). Source: KPMG
According to formula [3]: 
Terminal Value parameters
According to formula [22]: Expected Cash Flow stable growth/(r-g)Formula
Implied target Debt Ratio from target D/E
WACC Calculation parameters
US Equity Market Premium. Source: Damodaran, 2012
According to formula [17]:
According to formula [15]: 
Remarks and Sources
ABB DCF Valuation
( )[ ] [ ]1111 /1 −−−− +−+= ttttttt DETKdDKeEWACC




























  Bullish 68.950 70.162 30,67 63%
12%
  Base Case 61.345 62.557 27,34 18,83 45%
-9%




To compare the values of the above DCF results with a relative valuation, we started by 
composing a peer group earnings multiples: 
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Share Mkt cap
Price* (EURm) 2012e 2013e 2014e 2012e 2013e 2014e 2012e 2013e 2014e
EUR 32,8 9.349 0,5 0,5 0,5 5,5 5,1 4,6 7,8 7,0 6,5
GBP 2,0 1.936 0,5 0,5 0,4 4,3 3,9 3,0 5,5 5,0 4,0
EUR 28,0 7.249 1,9 1,8 1,7 8,4 8,0 7,6 10,0 9,3 8,3
EUR 15,7 15.538 0,7 0,7 0,6 6,1 5,3 4,8 10,1 8,2 7,0
EUR 51,5 27.722 1,4 1,3 1,2 8,2 7,7 7,2 10,0 9,3 8,4
EUR 76,0 68.382 0,9 0,9 0,8 6,6 6,2 5,6 8,8 8,0 7,3
Total 130.176
130.176 1,0 1,0 0,9 6,5 6,0 5,5 8,7 7,8 6,9
1,0 1,0 0,9 6,9 6,4 5,8 9,2 8,3 7,4

















Source: Danske Markets, Equity Research March/2012 
 
Applying the weighted average earnings multiples to respective forecasted figures in each 
scenarios we reach the following Enterprise Values: 
 
Relative Valuation - Enterprise Value
2012e 2013e 2014e 2012e 2013e 2014e
Bullish 44.371 44.868 44.179 49.297 47.874 46.540
Base Case 42.576 42.065 40.144 47.303 44.883 42.290
Bearish 40.436 39.240 37.002 44.926 41.868 38.979
Average 42.461 42.058 40.442 47.175 44.875 42.603
41.654 44.884
EV from (EV/EBIDTA) EV from (EV/EBIT)
values in mn USD
 
 
The results reached by applying peer multiples, highly differs from the ones from the DCF 
method. For instance, the difference for the EV calculated for the Base Case scenario 
(61.345 million USD) is between 37-47% from EV/EBIT and EV/EBIDTA, respectively. 
 
Even when we extend the sample of comparables to the segment of industry 
(mechanical/electrical), we reach the following outcomes: 
 
Pan-European Industry Multiples
2012e 2013e 2014e 2012e 2013e 2014e
7,2 6,7 6,2 9,4 8,5 7,7
9,0 8,3 5,7 11,0 9,8 8,0
8,0 7,3 6,0 10,1 9,0 7,8











Source: Danske Markets; own estimations of EBIDTA and EBIT – Base Case scenario 
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The differences in respect to DCF still remain relatively high, from 27% to 33% using 
EV/EBIT and EV/EBIDTA, respectively. 
 
The main source of explanation of this gap can be from the characteristics of ABB as a 
company, being a huge conglomerate with well diversified business divisions not identifying 
a reliable group of companies to perform a peer benchmark.  
 
Therefore, we are convinced, and will be applied in the next section, the outcomes coming 
from the DCF method. 
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5 – Valuation of the Acquisition 
 
5.1 – Assumptions and method used 
 
The valuation of the acquisition will start by the Synergy Valuation, like saying, what will the 
value creation for ABB from Gamesa acquisition. Meanwhile, it will be also paramount to 
see what will be the increase in the Gamesa’s forecasts, and therefore on its value, from 
benefiting of Operational and Financial synergies as being part of ABB’s group. 
 
In this sense, as stated in the Literature Review section, Damodaran (2005) exposed a 
road map aiming the above goals: 
 
1) Value the firms involved in the merger independently, by discounting expected 




Being the purpose of the current thesis, the incorporation by acquisition of Gamesa in ABB 
group, in order to apply the further methods stressed in the following points, all forecasts 
and valuation where exchanged from EUR to USD. The exchange rate used was the 
average of 201112 (1 EUR =1.3931 USD). 
 
All remain assumptions where maintained and for acquisition valuation proposal the base 




All remain assumptions where maintained and for acquisition valuation proposal the base 
case scenario was considered. 
 
Following the above, the outcomes of the stand alone valuation can be summarized in the 
following table: 
 
                                                 
12 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Foreign Exchange Rates. Release Date: January 
3, 2012. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5a/current/ 
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2) Estimate the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, by adding the values 
obtained for each firm in the first step. 
 
In this step, we considered the acquisition by incorporating Gamesa as ABB group 
Business Division (i.e, Wind Power Division), reaching the following valuation outcomes of 





3) Build in the effects of synergy into expected growth rates and cash flows and 
revalue the combined firm with synergy. The difference between the value of the 
combined firm with synergy and the value of the combined firm without synergy 








 Valuation Combined Firm (with synergies) 
Enterprise 
Value
net debt               
(as for 31.12.2011) Equity Value 
Equity Value per 
share (USD)
ABB + Gamesa 67.700 -194 67.894 29.67
values in mnUSD 
Base Case Scenario
Firms 
Standalone Valuation Outcomes 
Enterprise 
Value
net debt               
(as for 31.12.2011) Equity Value 






2.221 1.018 1.203 4.87
values in mnUSD 
Base Case Scenario
Firms 
61.345 -1.212 62.557 27.34
Valuation of combined firm (no synergy) 
Enterprise 
Value
net debt               
(as for 31.12.2011) Equity Value 
Equity Value per 
share (USD)
ABB + Gamesa 63.693 -194 63.886 27.92
values in mnUSD 
Base Case Scenario
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5.2 – Value of Synergies 
 
In a broad sense, the sources of synergy of incorporating Gamesa in ABB group as a Wind 




 Commercial Resources in place on a structural basis in more than 100 countries; 
 Credibility of ABB’s brand; 
 Cross selling with other divisions, especially the advantage of selling the Wind 
Turbine as additional product to the existing capacity of Wind Farm Balance of 
Plant supply, being therefore a turnkey product; 
 Existing network of clients with Wind Power assets in place and investing dynamics 
in the sector; 
 Boost the Services of Operating and Maintenance business. 
 
Gross Margin 
 60% of the Wind Turbine components, on average, with internal supply capacity. 
Benefiting of lower cost of supply; 
 Standards and fabrication procedures, coming from more than 100 years 




 Supply management and logistics (e.g. network of suppliers, benefiting from higher 
bargaining power, economies of scale) 
 Decommissioning of the existing fabrication overcapacity in Spain (Gamesa’s 
plants). In this sense, take advantage of the fabrication assets of ABB in the 
markets with more expect future growth (e.g. Germany, China, South America, 
India); 
 Redundancy of ~90% of commercial team and management/corporate operating 
divisions. 50 % of manufacturing headcount. The Business Development team 




 Higher Capex on Wind turbine division to face more market penetration and 
technology advancements in launching new wind turbine models to face market 
trends (e.g. offshore, higher than 2 MW onshore turbine models). 
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1 4.472 4.636 5.115 5.572 5.795 6.027 6.268 6.518 6.779 6.983 5.3%
2 4.472 4.636 4.902 5.015 5.216 5.424 5.641 5.867 6.102 6.285 4.0%
∆% 0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1%
1 36% 36% 37% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38%
2 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36%
∆% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 4.2% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6%
1 1.309 1.252 1.228 1.282 1.275 1.326 1.379 1.434 1.491 1.536
2 1.309 1.333 1.381 1.399 1.457 1.517 1.579 1.644 1.712 1.805
∆% 0.0% -6.1% -11.1% -8.4% -12.5% -12.6% -12.7% -12.8% -12.9% -14.9%
1 134 243 409 585 695 723 752 782 814 838 25.3%
2 134 162 196 226 235 244 254 264 275 259 9.4%
∆% 0% 50% 109% 159% 196% 196% 196% 196% 196% 223%
1 3% 5% 8% 11% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
2 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4%
∆% 0% 50% 100% 133% 167% 167% 167% 167% 167% 191%
1 348 383 256 223 232 241 251 261 271 279
2 348 383 237 195 167 172 177 183 188 178
∆% 0.0% 0.0% 8.0% 14.3% 38.7% 40.0% 41.4% 42.7% 44.1% 57.1%
CAGR     
(2012-20)













As expressed above, all synergies will account mainly on Gamesa that will become the 
Wind Power business segment of ABB’s group.  
 






net debt               
(as for 31.12.2011)
Equity Value Equity Value per 
share (USD)
∆ % 
1 ABB + Gamesa (with synergy) 67.700 -194 67.894 29.67 
2 ABB + Gamesa (without synergy) 63.693 -194 63.886 27.92 
∆ ( 1 - 2 ) 4.008 1.75 6.3% 
3 ABB standalone 61.345 -1.212 62.557 27.34 
∆ ( 1 - 3 ) 5.337 2.33 8.5% 
Outcomes summary 
values in mnUSD VALUATION of the COMBINED FIRM 
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Synergies have a huge impact on the value of the combined firm. The several sources of 
synergy, addressed by ABB to the Gamesa will boost in 6.28% the value of the combined 
firm. 
 
The main responsible for this improvement is the cost synergies, accounting for ~78% of 
total synergies. Despite of this we assist that the wind power division, with the current 
status as expressed in the company profile section, will require some additional 
investments efforts to address some technological needs (impacting negatively on value 
creation) to allow a revenue growth, which accounts for around a “net” value increase of 
around 22%. 
 





























The Value of Synergy 
Sources
Equity of the merged 
firm without synergies 
Equity of the merged 
firm with synergies 
Difference weight 
(%) 
Revenue Growth 63.885 65.435 1.549 38.7%
Gross Margin increase 63.885 65.139 1.253 31.3%
Operating Expenses savings 63.885 65.777 1.891 47.2%
Higher Investments effect 63.885 63.200 -686 -17.1%
Total Synergy 63.885 67.894 4.008 100% 
values in USDm 
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Sources of Synergies Allocation                                                                                                      
 
Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value 
Revenue Growth 38.7% 1.549 78.0% 1.208 22.0% 341 
  Commercial Structure 10% 155 90% 139 10% 15 
  ABB brand 15% 232 100% 232 0% 0 
  Divisions cross-selling 5% 77 100% 77 0% 0 
  Network of clients 20% 310 70% 217 30% 93 
  Boost of O&M services 50% 775 70% 542 30% 232 
Gross Margin 31.3% 1.253 88.0% 1.103 12.0% 150 
  WTG components internal supply capacity 20% 251 100% 251 0% 0 
  Standards and fabrication procedures 60% 752 90% 677 10% 75 
  Economies of scale 20% 251 70% 175 30% 75 
Operating Expenses 47.2% 1.891 52.0% 984 48.0% 908 
  Supply management and logistics 20% 378 100% 378 0% 0 
  Reducing overcapacity 40% 757 50% 378 50% 378 
  Team structure redundancies 40% 757 30% 227 70% 530 
Higher Investment needs -17.1% -686 0% 0 100% -686 
Total 100.0% 4.008 82.2% 3.295 17.8% 714 
Total ABB Gamesa 
Sources of Synergy 
Values in mnUSD 
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5.3 – Transaction and Offer 
 
As discussed before, in the industry review topic, there are some key motives for M&A in 
the wind manufacturing sector: 
 
1) Technology access (e.g. offshore); 
2) Consolidation to reduce the over-capacity and margin pressure; 
3) Possible sector entry through the acquisition of incumbents. 
 
In this transaction we are clearly in the point 3 above. For this motive, considering the 
current players profile, we see that the most reliable target aiming this goal, are the so 
called “pioneers”. After the past transactions, and the current status quo remains Nordex, 
Vestas, and Gamesa (excluding the Chinese and other Asian players). 
 
Additionally, the low valuation levels of larger players, coupled with medium-term growth 
potential (~10% per annum in the medium-term) could now prove more attractive to 
industrial players, like ABB. We think the recent sell-off in wind turbine manufacturers’ 
shares has changed the list of potential targets. 
 
In respect to Gamesa as a target, we see that the key issues are: 
 
a) Receptiveness of the major shareholder (Iberdrola) to sell its stake (~20%); 
b) Market cap and low valuation13; 
c) An acquisition could be based on a turnaround rationale. 
 
On the possible acquires domain we can address the following categories: 
 
a) Asian Manufacturers (e.g. Samsung, Hyundai, Sinovel or Goldwind) in order to 
acquire turbine platforms readily bankable in Western markets. Also is expected 
that Chinese turbine makers to accelerate overseas expansion as growth in China 
decelerates; 
b) Large conglomerates / Capital Goods (e.g. ABB) seeking exposure to the still 
attractive growth of the wind sector. 
 
The five largest acquisitions of wind turbine manufacturers in the past were achieved at an 
average of ~1.2x EV/Sales.  
 
                                                 
13 At 31.12.2011, the book value per share is 9, 54 USD vs. 4, 47 USD market price. 
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Above we have highlighted in bold, the most similar transactions to the object of this thesis, 
in terms of target, acquirer and market goal.  
 
Recent press articles referred to Alstom eying to take-over REpower for a consideration of 
EUR1.5 bn, i.e. ~1.2xEV/sales, which is in line with past acquisitions in the segment. If this 
multiple was applied to the ABB/Gamesa transaction we would find that the price for 
acquisition is 4.05 bnUSD, which reaches nearly the maximum price (i.e. the all estimated 
synergy). 
 
As previously referred, in order to reach the fair value for the transaction, it also must be 
taken into account that Gamesa is clearly undervalued in the market. At 31.12.2011, the 
market price is 113% below the equity book value. 
 
In this case, is recommended to pay for the acquisition in cash, also for the reasons pointed 
out in the Literature Review section. 
 
For the price issue, the literature review points out that in these cases, the share price 
could be estimated both in terms of liquidation value or applying a past transaction multiple. 
Considering that (as showed in the synergies forecast) Gamesa could be still attractive with 
operating and control synergies coming from the ABB incorporation, and the financial 
distress is not currently an issue, the most appropriate method could be a past reliable 
multiple.  
 
As we can see in the table that stress the past transactions, we must point out that the 
aspect that puts more pressure on the players sector valuation rationales is the EBIT 
margin. Therefore, we will use EV/EBIT as a reference and 14x as benchmark. This will 
also result in EV/Sales of 0,6x which is near the lowest transaction multiple (Enron/GE), 
which occurred in the starting trend of highly growing dynamics of the market, but 







Repower Suzlon 2007 1300 1.8x 32x Consolidation
Multibrid Areva 2007 77 1.1x n.r. Sector entry
Ecotecnia Alstom 2007 350 1.1x 18x Sector entry
Bonus Siemens 2004 250 1.3x 14x Sector entry
Enron Wind GE 2002 409 0.5x n.r. Sector entry; Operating Loss
Source:  Company Data; Bryan, Garnier & Co. 
Main Acquisitions of Wind Turbine Manufacturers 
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Going to a DCF approach in term of transaction valuation, and taking into account the 
synergy sharing present into the above topic, we reach the following outcomes: 
 
∆ % Comments
Equity Value 1.500 25%
Difference from standalone 
valuation of Gamesa
Net Debt 1.018 - -
Enterprise Value 2.518 13%
Difference from standalone 
valuation of Gamesa
EBIT 182 - Level at 31.12.2011
Sales 4.225 - Level at 31.12.2011
EV/EBIT 14 x 
EV/Sales 0.6 x 
∆ % Comments
Share Price 6.07 - 




Premium upon the share price 
at offer announcement date 
Sources:  Company Data; Own estimations 




end of 2011 
Value 
Values in USD 
Values in mnUSD 
100% shares of Gamesa (247mn)
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As expressed in the chart above, including the Gamesa’s synergy share (714 EURm), the 
maximum value that ABB could pay would be 1.917 EURm, representing a 59% premium 
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6 - Conclusions 
 
Valuation can be somewhat a black box, resulting in an ambiguous topic. As stressed in the 
Literature Review section, researcher and practitioners have a set of tools and techniques 
available for this purpose. When analyzing investment decisions, especially mergers, this 
ambiguity issue can be higher, due to problems arising from different assumptions and 
available data. 
 
From the valuation techniques point of view, the different available tools and a non 
consensual model is also a source of uncertainties in the outcomes.  
 
Although not always conclusive, academic research is extensive, jointly with some practice 
experience, deep knowledge of the business sector(s) involved, I believe it is possible to 
gather a set of tools upon the available data to evaluate a deal and propose an offer. Yet, I 





In the last years, especially up to 2010, Gamesa, one of the pioneers in the wind power 
industry, was a strong player with results and performance that laid the company in the top-
10 ranking taking advantage of its privileged competitive position in the Spanish market (2nd 
market in Europe). Recently, facing huge problems in its internationalization program, 
original market freeze, and high delays in launching new turbines platforms in line with the 
market demand (e.g. higher onshore turbine capacity, and offshore), Gamesa start to loose 
it’s competitive position and facing big problems on profitability14. 
 
Other players with the same characteristics of Gamesa by being pioneers (e.g. Nordex, 
Vestas), are suffering from the market pressure on prices and margins demanding higher 
production efficiency to mitigate the less incentives to wind energy that will be the 
mainstream especially in Europe and the US. Gamesa have also low commercial strength, 
being tight to framework agreements with large and few customer (e.g. utilities, especially 
its major shareholder Iberdrola), which lead to a high commercial dependency. 
 
The consequence in terms of market cap, was a loss of around 80% only in 2011, leading 
to a situation of being an attractive target for a possible takeover. 
 
As discussed in the industry review, the wind power sector remains attractive with growth 
perspectives, but with different competitive challenges especially demanding production 
efficiency, cross selling, and market bargaining power. In this sense, we assist the entrance 
of large conglomerates on the market through M&A, being the targets precisely the 
pioneers (e.g. Siemens, Alstom, Areva, General Electric). 
Those companies have strong advantages to address the market requirements, and being 
diversified companies could have a turnkey offer in the value chain. 
                                                 
14 The overcapacity of its production assets it’s also a strong example of this symptom.  
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ABB, gather in its characteristics all the requirements to take a position in this market, 
being all well the movements of its close peers. 
 
Transaction and Results 
 
With the financial data and industry outlook in min, Gamesa standalone was valued with 
the DCF framework, with an outcome of 9% upside potential. As well in ABB side, the DCF 
framework was applied, in a group perspective, being the multiples based valuation 
differing highly, maintaining the outcomes of the first method for the deal valuation purpose. 
 
Then, it was built a WACC-based valuation model that could sustain the combined firm, 
and assessed the effect of cost and revenue synergies in the value of the merged entity.  
 
This resulted in a high net synergy, not meaningful in respect to Gamesa’s market cap, as 
well only 18% attributed to Gamesa. This shows the high value creation to the business 
being part of the ABB.  
 
In the transaction valuation was used also the last transaction multiples resulting in a 
premium of 36% (1.5 bnUSD total price) of the market cap. Applying the synergies 
attributable to Gamesa into the DCF model outcomes, the result in terms of possible upside 
relative to the stand alone valuation is 59% (1.9 bnUSD total price). 
 
The goal of this deal, in order to reach the expect result for ABB, is to buy 100% Gamesa’s 
shares. Despite of the synergies valuation, the fair value for this transaction is to present an 
offer of 1.5 bnUSD, representing the above stated 36% premium.  
 
Any possibility of an M&A transaction involving Gamesa, should be considered in terms of 
Iberdrola’s perspective for its feasibility. Iberdrola15 is Gamesa’s large customer and 
shareholder (19,6%), therefore a key element in any M&A equation.  
 
In opposition to other pure-play listed peers (e.g. Vestas and Nordex), Gamesa has a 
largest single shareholder. However, among other issues, an outright acquisition of 
Gamesa by Iberdrola has a low probability to occur, given their unrelated cash-flows and 
investment cycles. 
 
                                                 
15 is a Spanish private multinational electric utility company based in Bilbao, Basque Country. Iberdrola has a 
workforce of around 33,000 employees in over 40 countries on four continents serving around 30 million 
customers. Subsidiaries include Iberdrola Renovables, Iberdrola Portugal (Portugal), Scottish Power (Scotland), 
Iberdrola USA (United States), Elektro (Brazil), Electropaz (Bolivia), among others. 
Since embarking on its growth and international expansion plan in 2001, Iberdrola has become Spain’s largest 
energy group by market capitalization, the global leader in wind energy and one of the world’s largest utilities by 
market capitalization. 
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But with the recent evolution of the sector (stressed in the industry review section), and the 
status of the industry favorable for M&A, Iberdrola could have a different investment 
rationale for their position in Gamesa. 
 
Currently, can be stated that Gamesa is a non-core and loss-making business for Iberdrola, 
with Gamesa’s share price decline trend already triggered and impairment charge in 2011.  
 
It’s important to notice again that in 2011 Gamesa lost almost 80% of its value on the 
market, although being excessive in terms of its fundamentals, reflects a lot of uncertainties 
and instability observed by investors. 
 
We can state that Gamesa starts to become a painful investment for Iberdrola, and could 
accept that above stated price. 
 
Nevertheless, this takeover operation could face some obstacle due to non-financial 
reasons that can change the investment rational, like: 
 
 Political aspects: both companies (Gamesa and Iberdrola) with their headquarters 
in Basque Country in Spain with historical political support from authorities; 
 Economical aspects: for the synergies take place, the most probable scenario is 
the production assets leave the Region with a large impact in terms of employment 
and GDP. 
 
In this sense, ABB could offer a price of 1.9 bnUSD (74% premium over the market price at 
announcement) recognizing all the synergies attributable to Gamesa, being this a good 
argument to convince Iberdrola to sell if any hostility verified in the deal.  
 






Gamesa to leattributab lueSynergy Va
==  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that if the deal will not result in the expected synergies, the 
value at risk is quite low in terms of ABB’s estimated Equity Value. 
 
Payment and Financing 
 
Putting all variables together, the deal must assume the form of 100% acquisition, with 
payment in cash. Being Gamesa undervalued and huge synergies can be achieved (as 
demonstrated), its not recommend stock to perform the payment. Additionally, it’s not 
foreseen any interest from ABB side, even by the high difference in dimension, of doing in 
an opposite way. 
 
The low level of debt and leverage of ABB, added by its investment policy, will suggest that 
ABB will not issue debt to perform the operation. As observed in the Company Profile, it’s 
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not expected any consequences of credit rating this acquisition by cash without issue of 
debt. 
 
One appropriated final remark is that Gamesa, with the success of the transaction based 
on the proposed framework, will not continue to be listed in the market, being part of ABB 
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7 - Appendix 
 
GAMESA - Base Case Scenario









Spain 198 232 125 0 0 0
YoY growth -77% 17% -46% -100% - -
Europe 524 563 600 630 660 680
YoY growth -48% 7% 7% 5% 5% 3%
USA 678 382 550 300 450 500
YoY growth 44% -44% 44% -45% 50% 11%
China 664 650 450 500 550 620
YoY growth 41% -2% -31% 11% 10% 13%
India 295 519 500 700 800 880
YoY growth 1744% 76% -4% 40% 14% 10%
Central and South America 152 428 628 550 550 600
YoY growth 63% 182% 47% -12% 0% 9%
Others 76 28 147 520 440 320
YoY growth -68% -63% 425% 254% -15% -27%

























GAMESA - Bearish Scenario









Spain 168 232 125 0 0 0
YoY growth -80% 38% -46% -100% - -
Europe 524 563 600 630 630 650
YoY growth -48% 7% 7% 5% 0% 3%
USA 678 382 400 300 350 400
YoY growth 44% -44% 5% -25% 17% 14%
China 664 650 450 450 500 550
YoY growth 41% -2% -31% 0% 11% 10%
India 195 519 500 650 750 850
YoY growth 1119% 166% -4% 30% 15% 13%
Central and South America 100 428 600 550 550 600
YoY growth 8% 328% 40% -8% 0% 9%
Others 76 28 125 470 420 350
YoY growth -68% -63% 346% 276% -11% -17%
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GAMESA - Bullish Scenario









Spain 168 232 125 0 0 0
YoY growth -80% 38% -46% -100% - -
Europe 524 563 600 630 660 680
YoY growth -48% 7% 7% 5% 5% 3%
USA 678 382 550 300 450 500
YoY growth 44% -44% 44% -45% 50% 11%
China 664 650 450 500 550 650
YoY growth 41% -2% -31% 11% 10% 18%
India 195 519 500 700 850 900
YoY growth 1119% 166% -4% 40% 21% 6%
Central and South America 100 428 628 650 650 750
YoY growth 8% 328% 47% 4% 0% 15%
Others 76 28 147 520 440 520
YoY growth -68% -63% 425% 254% -15% 18%




















Volumes of Sales (MW)
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Revenues by Scenario (mn€)
GAMESA
2010 2011 2012e 2013e 2014e 2015e
Total 
(2012-15)
Bullish - - 3.210 3.432 3.672 4.000
YoY growth - - 6% 7% 7% 9%
Base Case 2.736 3.033 3.210 3.328 3.519 3.600
YoY growth -14% 11% 6% 4% 6% 2%
Bearish - - 2.996 3.172 3.264 3.400








2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015




Scenarios 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bullish - - 4,0% 4,5% 5,0% 6,0%
Base Case 4,3% 4,3% 3,0% 3,5% 4,0% 4,5%








Values in mn€ 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
EBIT 131 96 116 141 162 168 175 182 190 197 186
D&A 106 120 125 135 130 134 138 142 146 151 142
CAPEX 229 250 275 170 140 120 124 127 131 135 128
Change in Working Capital 700 -104 -65 -110 -184 -90 18 19 20 20 19
Tax 34 27 33 39 45 47 49 51 53 55 52
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) -726 43 -1 176 291 225 122 127 132 138 130
1788




Shares outstanding (m) 247
Equity Value per share (€) 3,50
GAMESA Standalone Valuation
DCF Valuation Method - Base Case
Growth Period Stable Growth
 
 






Values in mn€ 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
EBIT 131 90 111 131 153 159 165 172 179 186 175
D&A 106 120 125 135 130 134 138 142 146 151 142
CAPEX 229 250 275 170 140 120 124 127 131 135 127
Change in Working Capital 700 -104 -65 -110 -184 -90 18 19 20 20 19
Tax 34 25 31 37 43 45 46 48 50 52 49
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) -726 39 -5 169 284 218 115 120 124 130 122
1681




Shares outstanding (m) 247
Equity Value per share (€) 3,15
GAMESA Standalone Valuation
DCF Valuation Method - Bearish Scenario
Growth Period Stable Growth
 
 




Values in mn€ 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
EBIT 131 96 120 147 180 187 195 202 211 219 206
D&A 106 120 125 135 130 134 138 142 146 151 142
CAPEX 229 250 275 170 140 120 124 127 131 135 127
Change in Working Capital 700 -104 -65 -110 -184 -90 18 19 20 20 19
Tax 34 27 34 41 50 52 55 57 59 61 58
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) -726 43 1 181 304 239 136 142 147 153 145
1988




Shares outstanding (m) 247
Equity Value per share (€) 4,08
GAMESA Standalone Valuation
DCF Valuation Method - Bullish Scenario
Growth Period Stable Growth
 
 




ABB - Base Case Scenario









Power Products 9.778 11.068 11.357 12.002 12.103 12.469
YoY growth -11% 13% 3% 6% 1% 3%
Power Systems 7.896 9.278 9.495 10.050 10.568 11.037
YoY growth 1% 18% 2% 6% 5% 4%
Discrete Automation and Motion 5.862 9.566 9.628 10.130 10.320 10.584
YoY growth 25% 63% 1% 5% 2% 3%
Low Voltage Products 4.686 5.364 5.721 6.251 6.499 6.928
YoY growth 15% 14% 7% 9% 4% 7%
Process Automation 7.383 8.726 9.017 9.536 9.613 9.928
YoY growth 10% 18% 3% 6% 1% 3%
Operating Divisions 35.605 44.002 45.218 47.969 49.103 50.947 272.844 193.237 7% 4%
Corporate and Others* -2.924 -3.792 -3.832 -3.943 -3.830 -3.843
Total 32.681 40.210 41.386 44.026 45.273 47.104 250.680 177.789 8% 4%

















ABB - Bullish Scenario









Power Products 9.778 11.068 12.584 13.465 12.809 13.448
YoY growth -11% 13% 14% 7% -5% 5%
Power Systems 7.896 9.278 11.031 11.913 12.866 14.347
YoY growth 1% 18% 19% 8% 8% 12%
Discrete Automation and Motion 5.862 9.566 11.079 11.633 11.933 12.846
YoY growth 25% 63% 16% 5% 3% 8%
Low Voltage Products 4.686 5.364 7.997 8.477 8.986 10.672
YoY growth 15% 14% 49% 6% 6% 19%
Process Automation 7.383 8.726 10.639 11.384 10.197 10.741
YoY growth 10% 18% 22% 7% -10% 5%
Operating Divisions 35.605 44.002 53.330 56.872 56.791 62.054 308.654 229.047 12% 5%
Corporate and Others* -2.924 -3.792 -7.522 -8.134 -5.506 -6.235
Total 32.681 40.210 45.808 48.738 51.285 55.819 274.541 201.650 11% 7%
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ABB - Bearish Scenario









Power Products 9.778 11.068 10.969 11.298 11.450 11.580
YoY growth -11% 13% -1% 3% 1% 1%
Power Systems 7.896 9.278 8.700 9.134 9.317 9.330
YoY growth 1% 18% -6% 5% 2% 0%
Discrete Automation and Motion 5.862 9.566 8.891 9.300 9.850 9.947
YoY growth 25% 63% -7% 5% 6% 1%
Low Voltage Products 4.686 5.364 5.065 5.216 5.373 5.376
YoY growth 15% 14% -6% 3% 3% 0%
Process Automation 7.383 8.726 8.378 8.797 9.000 9.093
YoY growth 10% 18% -4% 5% 2% 1%
Operating Divisions 35.605 44.002 42.003 43.745 44.990 45.326 255.671 176.064 5% 3%
Corporate and Others* -2.924 -3.792 -4.262 -4.436 -4.418 -4.649
Total 32.681 40.210 37.741 39.309 40.572 40.677 231.190 158.299 4% 3%
* includes interdivional eliminations
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ABB - Base Case 









Power Products 10.199 10.869 11.166 11.797 12.250 12.748
YoY growth -9% 7% 3% 6% 4% 4%
Power Systems 6.786 8.101 8.507 9.081 9.571 10.118
YoY growth 4% 19% 5% 7% 5% 6%
Discrete Automation and Motion 5.617 8.806 9.180 9.655 10.092 10.561
YoY growth 4% 57% 4% 5% 5% 5%
Low Voltage Products 4.554 5.304 5.534 6.264 6.703 7.247
YoY growth 12% 16% 4% 13% 7% 8%
Process Automation 7.432 8.300 8.667 9.115 9.435 9.847
YoY growth -5% 12% 4% 5% 4% 4%
Operating Divisions 34.588 41.380 43.054 45.912 48.051 50.521 263.506 187.538 8% 5%
Corporate and Others* -2.999 -3.390 -3.316 -3.773 -4.033 -4.273
Total 31.589 37.990 39.738 42.139 44.018 46.248 241.722 172.143 8% 5%




















ABB - Bullish Scenario









Power Products 10.199 10.869 11.636 12.469 12.829 13.558
YoY growth -9% 7% 7% 7% 3% 6%
Power Systems 6.786 8.101 8.949 9.808 10.887 12.014
YoY growth 4% 19% 10% 10% 11% 10%
Discrete Automation and Motion 5.617 8.806 9.677 10.208 10.735 11.468
YoY growth 4% 57% 10% 5% 5% 7%
Low Voltage Products 4.554 5.304 7.814 8.662 9.008 10.747
YoY growth 12% 16% 47% 11% 4% 19%
Process Automation 7.432 8.300 9.078 9.651 9.915 10.520
YoY growth -5% 12% 9% 6% 3% 6%
Operating Divisions 34.588 41.380 47.154 50.798 53.374 58.308 285.602 209.634 11% 7%
Corporate and Others* -2.999 -3.390 -5.741 -5.851 -4.932 -5.589
Total 31.589 37.990 41.413 44.947 48.442 52.719 257.100 187.521 11% 8%
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ABB - Bearish Scenario









Power Products 10.199 10.869 10.717 11.102 11.703 11.995
YoY growth -9% 7% -1% 4% 5% 2%
Power Systems 6.786 8.101 7.994 8.353 8.808 9.057
YoY growth 4% 19% -1% 4% 5% 3%
Discrete Automation and Motion 5.617 8.806 8.825 9.156 9.247 9.399
YoY growth 4% 57% 0% 4% 1% 2%
Low Voltage Products 4.554 5.304 5.036 5.061 5.086 5.015
YoY growth 12% 16% -5% 0% 0% -1%
Process Automation 7.432 8.300 8.300 8.595 8.762 8.922
YoY growth -5% 12% 0% 4% 2% 2%
Operating Divisions 34.588 41.380 40.872 42.267 43.606 44.388 247.101 171.133 5% 3%
Corporate and Others* -2.999 -3.390 -3.131 -2.958 -3.034 -2.924
Total 31.589 37.990 37.741 39.309 40.572 41.464 228.665 159.086 6% 3%
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AB B - Base  Case
V alues in m illions  USD
2007 2008 200 9 201 0 201 1 2012 2013 2014 201 5 201 6 201 7 201 8 20 19 20 20 Stable  >
Tota l Rev en ue 29 .183 34 .912 31 .795 31 .589 3 7.990 39 .738 42 .139 44 .018 46 .248 4 8.098 5 0.022 5 2.023 5 4.104 56.26 8 57.95 6
% g ro wth rate n /a 19,6% -8,9% -0,6% 20,3% 4,6% 6,0% 4,5% 5,1% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0%
- CO GS 20 .215 23 .972 22 .470 22 .060 2 6.556 27 .697 29 .371 30 .681 32 .235 3 3.524 3 4.865 3 6.260 3 7.710 39.21 9 40.39 5
% o f r evenu e 69,3% 68,7% 70,7% 69,8% 69,9% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69 ,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7 %
G ross P ro fit 8. 968 10 .940 9 .325 9 .529 1 1.434 12 .041 12 .768 13 .337 14 .013 1 4.574 1 5.157 1 5.763 1 6.393 17.04 9 17.56 1
% o f r evenu e 30,7% 31,3% 29,3% 30,2% 30,1% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30 ,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3 %
- Ope rating Ex p 4. 975 5.822 5 .528 5 .697 6 .744 6. 914 7.332 7 .659 8 .047 8 .369 8 .704 9.052 9.414 9.791 10.08 4
% o f r evenu e 17,0% 16,7% 17,4% 18,0% 17,8% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17 ,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4 %
- SG &A (Op. Ex.) 4. 373 5.161 4 .873 4 .995 5 .749 5. 841 6.194 6 .471 6 .798 7 .022 7 .303 7.595 7.845 8.159 8.404
% o f r evenu e 15,0% 14,8% 15,3% 15,8% 15,1% 14,7% 14,7% 14,7% 14,7% 14 ,6% 14,6% 14,6% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5 %
EBIT D A 4. 595 5.779 4 .452 4 .534 5 .685 6. 199 6.574 6 .867 7 .215 7 .551 7 .853 8.168 8.548 8.890 9.157
% o f r evenu e 15,7% 16,6% 14,0% 14,4% 15,0% 15,6% 15,6% 15,6% 15,6% 15 ,7% 15,7% 15,7% 15,8% 15,8% 15,8 %
- D  &  A (O p.  Ex) 602 661 655 702 995 1. 033 1.138 1 .188 1 .249 1 .347 1 .401 1.457 1.515 1.632 1.681
% o f r evenu e 2,1% 1,9% 2,1% 2,2% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,9% 2,9%
EBIT  (O p. P rofit) 3. 993 5.118 3 .797 3 .832 4 .690 5. 166 5.436 5 .678 5 .966 6 .205 6 .453 6.711 7.033 7.259 7.476
% o f r evenu e 13,7% 14,7% 11,9% 12,1% 12,3% 13,0% 12,9% 12,9% 12,9% 12 ,9% 12,9% 12,9% 13,0% 12,9% 12,9 %
- Taxes 595 1.119 1 .001 1 .018 1 .244 1. 094 1.151 1 .202 1 .263 1 .314 1 .366 1.421 1.489 1.537 1.583
% o f EB IT 14,9% 21,9% 26,4% 26,6% 26,5% 21,17% 21,17 % 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17%
NO PLAT 3. 398 3.999 2 .796 2 .814 3 .446 4. 072 4.285 4 .476 4 .703 4 .891 5 .087 5.290 5.544 5.722 5.894
% o f r evenu e 11,6% 11,5% 8,8% 8,9% 9,1% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10 ,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2 %
+ D &  A 602 661 655 702 995 1. 033 1.138 1 .188 1 .249 1 .347 1 .401 1.457 1.515 1.632 1.681
% o f r evenu e 2,1% 1,9% 2,1% 2,2% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,9% 2,9%
- CAP EX 756 1.171 967 840 1 .021 1. 152 1.222 1 .277 1 .341 1 .395 1 .451 1.509 1.569 1.632 1.681
% o f r evenu e 2,6% 3,4% 3,0% 2,7% 2,7% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9%
Wor kin g Capital 1. 092 891 1 .259 1 .043 2 .224 2. 345 2.486 2 .597 2 .729 2 .838 2 .951 3.069 3.192 3.320 3.419
% o f r evenu e 3,7% 2,6% 4,0% 3,3% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9%
- WC Investm ent n /a -201 368 -216 1 .181 121 142 111 132 109 11 4 11 8 12 3 12 8 1 00
% o f r evenu e n/a -0,6% 1,2% -0,7% 3,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2%
Free Cash  F low n /a 3.690 2 .116 2 .892 2 .239 3. 833 4.059 4 .277 4 .479 4 .734 4 .923 5.120 5.368 5.594 5.794
% o f r evenu e n/a 10,6% 6,7% 9,2% 5,9% 9,6% 9,6% 9,7% 9,7% 9,8% 9,8% 9,8% 9,9% 9,9% 10,0 %






Free Cash  F low  Dis counte d
V alu e pe r share (USD )
E nterpris e V alu e
N et Deb t
E quity Value
N r. of S hares  (mi ll ion s)
DCF Standa lone  Va lution
Pr ojected Y ear  Ending
Free Cash  F low  to  the F irm  Analysis
His tor ical Y ea r En ded
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AB B - Bullish  S cenar io
V alues in m illions  U SD
2007 2008 2009 201 0 201 1 2012 2013 2014 2015 201 6 201 7 201 8 201 9 20 20 Stable  >
Tota l Rev en ue 29 .183 34 .912 31 .795 31 .589 3 7.990 41 .413 44 .947 48 .442 52 .719 54 .828 5 7.021 5 9.302 6 1.674 6 4.141 6 6.06 5
% g ro wth rate n /a 19,6% -8,9% -0 ,6% 20 ,3% 9,0% 8,5% 7,8% 8,8% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0%
- CO GS 20 .215 23 .972 22 .470 22 .060 2 6.556 28 .865 31 .328 33 .764 36 .745 38 .215 3 9.744 4 1.333 4 2.987 4 4.706 4 6.04 7
% o f r evenu e 69,3% 68,7% 70,7% 69,8% 69 ,9% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 6 9,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7%
G ross P ro fit 8. 968 10 .940 9 .325 9 .529 1 1.434 12 .548 13 .619 14 .678 15 .974 16 .613 1 7.277 1 7.968 1 8.687 1 9.435 2 0.01 8
% o f r evenu e 30,7% 31,3% 29,3% 30,2% 30 ,1% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 3 0,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3%
- Ope rating Ex p 4. 975 5.822 5 .528 5 .697 6 .744 7. 206 7.821 8.429 9 .173 9 .540 9 .922 1 0.319 1 0.731 1 1.161 1 1.49 5
% o f r evenu e 17,0% 16,7% 17,4% 18,0% 17 ,8% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 1 7,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4%
- SG &A (Op. Ex.) 4. 373 5.161 4 .873 4 .995 5 .749 6. 088 6.607 7.121 7 .750 8 .005 8 .325 8 .658 8.943 9.300 9.579
% o f r evenu e 15,0% 14,8% 15,3% 15,8% 15 ,1% 14,7% 14,7% 14,7% 14,7% 14,6% 1 4,6% 14,6% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5%
EBIT D A 4. 595 5.779 4 .452 4 .534 5 .685 6. 460 7.012 7.557 8 .224 8 .608 8 .952 9 .310 9.744 1 0.134 1 0.43 8
% o f r evenu e 15,7% 16,6% 14,0% 14,4% 15 ,0% 15,6% 15,6% 15,6% 15,6% 15,7% 1 5,7% 15,7% 15,8% 15,8% 15,8%
- D  &  A (O p.  Ex) 602 661 655 702 995 1. 077 1.214 1.308 1 .423 1 .535 1 .597 1 .660 1.727 1.860 1.916
% o f r evenu e 2,1% 1,9 % 2,1% 2,2% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,9% 2,9%
EBIT  (O p. P rofit) 3. 993 5.118 3 .797 3 .832 4 .690 5. 384 5.798 6.249 6 .801 7 .073 7 .356 7 .650 8.018 8.274 8.522
% o f r evenu e 13,7% 14,7% 11,9% 12,1% 12 ,3% 13,0% 12,9% 12,9% 12,9% 12,9% 1 2,9% 12,9% 13,0% 12,9% 12,9%
- Taxes 595 1.119 1 .001 1 .018 1 .244 1. 140 1.227 1.323 1 .440 1 .497 1 .557 1 .619 1.697 1.752 1.804
% o f EB IT 14,9% 21,9% 26,4% 26,6% 26 ,5% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17%
NO PLAT 3. 398 3.999 2 .796 2 .814 3 .446 4. 244 4.571 4.926 5 .361 5 .575 5 .799 6 .030 6.320 6.523 6.718
% o f r evenu e 11,6% 11,5% 8,8% 8,9% 9,1% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 1 0,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2%
+ D &  A 602 661 655 702 995 1. 077 1.214 1.308 1 .423 1 .535 1 .597 1 .660 1.727 1.860 1.916
% o f r evenu e 2,1% 1,9 % 2,1% 2,2% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,9% 2,9%
- CAP EX 756 1.171 967 840 1 .021 1. 201 1.303 1.405 1 .529 1 .590 1 .654 1 .720 1.789 1.860 1.916
% o f r evenu e 2,6% 3,4 % 3,0% 2,7% 2,7% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9%
Wor kin g Capital 1. 092 891 1 .259 1 .043 2 .224 2. 443 2.652 2.858 3 .110 3 .235 3 .364 3 .499 3.639 3.784 3.898
% o f r evenu e 3,7% 2,6 % 4,0% 3,3% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9%
- WC Investm ent n /a -201 368 -216 1 .181 219 209 206 252 124 129 13 5 14 0 14 6 11 4
% o f r evenu e n/a -0,6% 1,2% -0 ,7% 3,1% 0,5% 0,5% 0,4% 0,5% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2%
Free Cash  F low n /a 3.690 2 .116 2 .892 2 .239 3. 900 4.272 4.623 5 .003 5 .396 5 .612 5 .837 6.119 6.377 6.605
% o f r evenu e n/a 10,6% 6,7% 9,2% 5,9% 9,4% 9,5% 9,5% 9,5% 9,8% 9,8% 9,8% 9,9% 9,9% 10,0%
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ABB - Bearish Scenario
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Stable >
Total Revenue 29.183 34.912 31.795 31.589 37.990 37.741 39.309 40.572 41.464 43.123 44.848 46.641 48.507 50.447 51.961
% growth rate n/a 19,6% -8,9% -0,6% 20,3% -0,7% 4,2% 3,2% 2,2% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0%
- COGS 20.215 23.972 22.470 22.060 26.556 26.305 27.398 28.279 28.900 30.057 31.259 32.509 33.809 35.162 36.217
% of revenue 69,3% 68,7% 70,7% 69,8% 69,9% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7% 69,7%
Gross Profit 8.968 10.940 9.325 9.529 11.434 11.436 11.911 12.293 12.564 13.066 13.589 14.132 14.698 15.286 15.744
% of revenue 30,7% 31,3% 29,3% 30,2% 30,1% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3% 30,3%
- Operating Exp 4.975 5.822 5.528 5.697 6.744 6.567 6.840 7.060 7.215 7.503 7.803 8.116 8.440 8.778 9.041
% of revenue 17,0% 16,7% 17,4% 18,0% 17,8% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4% 17,4%
- SG&A (Op. Ex.) 4.373 5.161 4.873 4.995 5.749 5.548 5.778 5.964 6.095 6.296 6.548 6.810 7.034 7.315 7.534
% of revenue 15,0% 14,8% 15,3% 15,8% 15,1% 14,7% 14,7% 14,7% 14,7% 14,6% 14,6% 14,6% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5%
EBITDA 4.595 5.779 4.452 4.534 5.685 5.888 6.132 6.329 6.468 6.770 7.041 7.323 7.664 7.971 8.210
% of revenue 15,7% 16,6% 14,0% 14,4% 15,0% 15,6% 15,6% 15,6% 15,6% 15,7% 15,7% 15,7% 15,8% 15,8% 15,8%
- D & A (Op. Ex) 602 661 655 702 995 981 1.061 1.095 1.120 1.207 1.256 1.306 1.358 1.463 1.507
% of revenue 2,1% 1,9% 2,1% 2,2% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,9% 2,9%
EBIT (Op. Profit) 3.993 5.118 3.797 3.832 4.690 4.906 5.071 5.234 5.349 5.563 5.785 6.017 6.306 6.508 6.703
% of revenue 13,7% 14,7% 11,9% 12,1% 12,3% 13,0% 12,9% 12,9% 12,9% 12,9% 12,9% 12,9% 13,0% 12,9% 12,9%
- Taxes 595 1.119 1.001 1.018 1.244 1.039 1.074 1.108 1.132 1.178 1.225 1.274 1.335 1.378 1.419
% of EBIT 14,9% 21,9% 26,4% 26,6% 26,5% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17%
NOPLAT 3.398 3.999 2.796 2.814 3.446 3.868 3.997 4.126 4.217 4.385 4.561 4.743 4.971 5.130 5.284
% of revenue 11,6% 11,5% 8,8% 8,9% 9,1% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2% 10,2%
+ D & A 602 661 655 702 995 981 1.061 1.095 1.120 1.207 1.256 1.306 1.358 1.463 1.507
% of revenue 2,1% 1,9% 2,1% 2,2% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,9% 2,9%
- CAPEX 756 1.171 967 840 1.021 1.094 1.140 1.177 1.202 1.251 1.301 1.353 1.407 1.463 1.507
% of revenue 2,6% 3,4% 3,0% 2,7% 2,7% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9%
Working Capital 1.092 891 1.259 1.043 2.224 2.227 2.319 2.394 2.446 2.544 2.646 2.752 2.862 2.976 3.066
% of revenue 3,7% 2,6% 4,0% 3,3% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9% 5,9%
- WC Investment n/a -201 368 -216 1.181 3 93 75 53 98 102 106 110 114 89
% of revenue n/a -0,6% 1,2% -0,7% 3,1% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% Terminal Value
Free Cash Flow n/a 3.690 2.116 2.892 2.239 3.752 3.826 3.970 4.081 4.244 4.414 4.591 4.812 5.016 5.195 74.209
% of revenue n/a 10,6% 6,7% 9,2% 5,9% 9,9% 9,7% 9,8% 9,8% 9,8% 9,8% 9,8% 9,9% 9,9% 10,0%









Nr. of Shares (millions)
DCF Standalone Valution
Values in mn USD
Historical Year Ended
Free Cash Flow Discounted
Projected Year Ending
Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
Value per share (USD)
 
 




ABB + Gamesa (without synergies)
Values in mnUSD
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Stable >
EBIT (Op. Profit) 5.300 5.598 5.874 6.192 6.439 6.697 6.965 7.297 7.533 7.736
- Taxes 1.122 1.185 1.244 1.311 1.363 1.418 1.474 1.545 1.595 1.638
% of EBIT 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17%
Free Cash Flow to the Firm Analysis
NOPLAT 4.178 4.413 4.631 4.881 5.076 5.279 5.490 5.753 5.938 6.098
+ D & A 1.200 1.312 1.377 1.430 1.533 1.593 1.655 1.719 1.842 1.879
- CAPEX 1.501 1.605 1.513 1.536 1.562 1.623 1.686 1.752 1.820 1.859
Working Capital 2.345 2.486 2.597 2.729 2.838 2.951 3.069 3.192 3.320 3.419
- WC Investment -24 51 -42 -125 -16 139 145 151 156 126 Terminal Value
Free Cash Flow 3.902 4.069 4.536 4.899 5.064 5.111 5.314 5.569 5.805 5.993 85.487
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DCF Valuation
ABB + Gamesa (with synergies)
Values in mnUSD
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Stable >
EBIT (Op. Profit) 5.300 5.679 6.088 6.551 6.900 7.176 7.463 7.816 8.072 8.314
% of revenue 13,3% 13,5% 13,8% 14,2% 14,3% 14,3% 14,3% 14,4% 14,3% 14,3%
- Taxes 1.122 1.202 1.289 1.387 1.461 1.519 1.580 1.655 1.709 1.760
% of EBIT 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17% 21,17%
Free Cash Flow to the Firm Analysis
NOPLAT 4.178 4.477 4.799 5.164 5.439 5.657 5.883 6.161 6.363 6.554
+ D & A 1.200 1.312 1.444 1.472 1.579 1.642 1.707 1.776 1.903 1.960
- CAPEX 1.500 1.605 1.532 1.564 1.627 1.692 1.759 1.830 1.903 1.960
Working Capital 2.345 2.486 2.597 2.729 2.838 2.951 3.069 3.192 3.320 3.419
- WC Investment -24 51 -42 -125 -16 139 145 151 156 126 Terminal Value
Free Cash Flow 3.902 4.133 4.753 5.196 5.407 5.468 5.687 5.956 6.208 6.428 91.697
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